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Abstract 
 
This thesis exploits the relationship between taxation and level of democracy in 
resource abundant countries. The research is derived mainly from concepts of rentierism 
and fiscal sociology. Supporting the institutional explanation for rentierism, I argue that 
resource wealthy countries are secured with economical autonomy and therefore are not 
obligated to share political power more broadly with citizens in exchange for tax 
revenues or other forms of support. In order to analyze the linkage I have carried 
through three correlations using data from World Bank, IMF and Marshall, Gurr, 
Jaggers Polity IV . First, I find relatively strong support that resource-rich countries rely 
more on resource revenues than on established taxes. However, this research finds little 
support for the hypothesis that countries with a lower citizen taxation burden indicate 
resource rich autocracies. Last but not least, there seems to be no connection between 
the size of personal income and the type of political regime. Keeping in mind these 
results, this thesis proposes that fiscal policy plays a great role in the general 
institutional framework but the role of taxation as a secondary factor stays modest. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The relationship between the wealth of natural resources and politics has raised much 
academic interest. There is a commonly accepted understanding that natural resources 
have a great influence on a country’s development, but the direction of the influence 
remains debatable. On the one hand, natural-resources could promote democracy. There 
is a variety of literature which claims that natural resource-wealthy countries tend to 
have better prospects for development than countries with a low level of resources
1
. The 
resulting framework implies that natural resources provide economical stability to 
countries and therefore tend to grant more democracy
2
. On the other hand, there are 
studies which claim resource revenues have regime-stabilizing properties. The 
prominent theme contends that whatever externally obtained resources enable a regime 
to stay in power by whatever means are best for that regime, and this is true in 
democracies as it is in dictatorships
3
. In this sense, natural resources do not have 
“antidemocratic” or “pro-democratic” properties. In addition, there are several studies 
that imply a negative influence from natural revenues also variously termed in the 
literature as “paradox of plenty” or “resource curse”4. The New York Times columnist 
Thomas Friedman argues in his article “First Law of Petropolitics”, that “the price of oil 
and the pace of freedom always move in opposite directions in oil-rich petrol states”5. 
According to Thomas Friedman, a country could be defined as a petrol country if they 
are highly dependent on oil exports and with weak institutions or authoritarian 
governments. The author lists Azerbaijan, Angola, Chad, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, 
                                                             
1
D`Arcy, Michelle (2012) “Taxation, Democracy and State-Building: How Does Sequencing Matter?“; QoG 
Working Paper Series, Vol. 4, p. 4. 
2 For example the case of Botswana. After becoming independent from Britain in 1966 Botswana have 
proved to be one of the fastest growing developing nations and model for democrats through the 
region. Today Botswana`s diamond industry represents one third of the country’s GDPs and account for 
up to 70 – 80% of its export. For more see Eigen, Peter (2005) “Avoiding the Resource Curse: What can 
we learn from the case of Botswana?, Transparency International,  
(URL: http://eadi.org/gc2005/confweb/papersps/Peter_Eigen.pdf, accessed May 19, 2013). 
3 Morrison, Kevin M. (2009) “Oil, Nontax Revenue, and the Redistribution Foundations of Regime 
Stability”, International Organization, Vol. 63, No. 1, pp. 107-138. 
4 See for more Stevens, Paul (2003) “Resource Impact: Curse or Blessing? A Literature Survey” Journal of 
Energy Literature, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 3-42; Davis, Graham A., Tilton, John E. (2005) “The Resource Curse”, 
Natural Resources Forum, Vol. 29, No. 3, pp. 233-242. 
5 Freedman, Thomas L. (2006) “The First Law of Petropolitics”, Foreign Policy, No. 154, p. 31. 
6 
 
Iran, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Uzbekistan, and Venezuela as 
high petrol states. Therefore, countries like Britain, Norway, the United States etc, with 
already democratic institutions before their oil was discovered, are not subjected to the 
First Law of Petropolitics”. 
The aim of this thesis is to test the negative effect of natural resources often referred to 
as the resource curse. The fact that many of the poorest and most troubled countries in 
the world have a high level of resource wealth (See Figure 1) gives us reasonable 
evidence to believe in the harmful effect of natural resources. One of the most recent 
influential and comprehensive works on this topic by Michael L. Ross concludes that 
the oil-impedes-democracy claim is both valid and statistically robust, “…oil does hurt 
democracy and resource rents promote authoritarian rule
6.”  
The core of the framework of this thesis is, firstly, the concept of “rentierism”, which 
refers to states becoming heavily dependent on natural resource exports. Author of the 
Energy Economic: Concepts, Issues, Markets and Governance Subhes C. Bhattacharyya 
defines the resource export dependency as resource export revenues as a fraction of 
GDP. This is led by the idea that higher resource prices bring higher expected export 
revenues resulting in more dependency on resource export revenue for its GDP. Subhs 
C. Bhattacharyya identifies four indicators of resource dependency. First, the average 
effective export price, in constant US dollars per ton of export. Secondly, resource 
export importance compared to domestic use. Thirdly, oil dependency of the economy 
and last but not least, primary energy intensity of the economy.
7
 The second central idea 
of this thesis is the concept of “fiscal sociology” by Joseph Schumpeter, referred to also 
as the “taxation effect”. The purpose of revenue taxes in democratic countries is to fill 
the state budget and share responsibilities with its citizens. However, this “no taxation 
without representation” claim does not often apply to resource-rich countries. “There is 
no immediate need to share political power more broadly with citizens in exchange for 
tax revenues or other forms of support”8. Blessed with natural resources, a government 
receives sufficient revenues from the sale of natural resources, so there is no actual need 
                                                             
6 Ross, Michael L. (2001) “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?“, World Politics, Vol. 53, No. 3, p. 356.  
7 Bhattacharyya, Subhes C. (2011) Energy Economic: Concepts, Issues, Markets and Governance, 
Springer-Verlag: London, pp. 453-454.  
8 Dunning, Thad (2008) Crude Democracy: Natural Resource Wealth and Political Regimes (Cambridge 
Studies in Comparative Politics), Cambridge University Press, p. 2. 
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to collect taxes from citizens. Thus, it is more likely that natural resource-rich countries 
tax their citizens less or not at all. Instead of collecting revenues the primary function of 
the state has become distributer of the revenues. Providing society with all kinds of 
well-being and social support has become the basis for legitimacy. In turn, it is 
reasonable to believe the government is less accountable to their citizenry, and the 
general public has less interest and chance to demand accountability and representation 
from their government. 
The aim of this thesis is to test the linkage between taxation and regime in resource 
abundant countries. The general argument of this thesis takes for assumption that 
resource rents grant countries financial autonomy and, therefore, immunity from social 
pressure, since citizens are not necessarily included on the tax level, resulting in passive 
social outcome. The main hypothesis of this thesis contends that taxation as an 
institutional effect influences the level of democracy. This thesis supports the 
institutional approach for explaining a country’s social and economic undergoing, 
however the results of careful empirical analysis indicate that the relationship between 
fiscal policy and the level of democracy is not in a linear correlation. In other words, 
taxation as a secondary factor within the institutional framework is not the decisive 
factor.  
In order to analyze if the tax system in resource-rich countries could hinder democracy, 
I will explore three aspects of this claim. First, I will claim that mineral-wealthy 
countries have financial autonomy and are not obligated to collect taxes from citizens. 
Do resource-wealthy countries tax the population on the same basis as resource poor 
countries? If not, there is great reason to believe that their state budget is covered 
mainly by revenues from the sale of natural resources, and citizens’ contribution stays 
modest. This leads to my second hypothesis. I claim that petrochemical-rich countries 
tend to be more autocratic, since citizens are not included on the tax collection level. Is 
it correct that democratic countries include more citizens into governing the state than 
autocratic countries? Do countries with higher personal taxes tend to be more 
democratic or not, keeping in mind the “taxation effect”? Thirdly, how does personal 
income influence the regime, especially in resource wealthy countries?  
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There have been many studies on oil and its influence on a states development
9
. 
However, the scholarly attention towards natural-resources in general has stayed 
relatively modest. I believe the relationship between natural resources and politics 
should be analyzed in a broader sense and not be limited only to oil. It is reasonable to 
expect that if the rents from oil have an undermining effect on a state`s democracy, this 
effect should apply to other “externally obtained” revenues as well. Secondly, the 
concept of “rentier state” has often been used in the context of the Middle East. 
Furthermore, many “global studies” have excluded Middle East in their studies as an 
exception. However, I believe there is no reasonable ground for doing so. If natural 
resources are truly at fault, a comprehensive study could add knowledge about the so 
called “resource curse” all over the world. It could help explain and predict political 
problems in resource-wealthy countries around the world, such as Nigeria, Indonesia, 
Venezuela, Russia etc. Thirdly, using a simple analytical model for data available for 
2010 can provide us with valuable insight into the current relationship between natural 
resources and political systems. It would be useful to analyze if the relationship is 
preserved in a cross-time analysis, however, this goes beyond the scope of this research. 
In the remainder of this thesis I will proceed as follows. First, I begin with outlining the 
central concepts of this thesis. Chapter 2, “Theoretical Framework”, provides us with 
knowledge about previous empirical and theoretical research in the field of the resource 
curse. I will clarify the concepts of “rentier state” and “taxation effect” and describe the 
previous academic background. Chapter 3 describes the research design and is followed 
by results and discussion in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 takes a closer look on the state-
economy relationship in resource rich Norway, Venezuela and Qatar. This thesis ends 
with a conclusion and short guidelines for further research (Chapter 6).  
                                                             
9 See for example Michael L. Ross (2001) “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?” World Politics, Vol. 53, pp. 325-
61; Smith, Benjamin (2006) “The Wrong Kind of Crisis“, Studies in Comparative International 
Development, Vol. 40, No. 4, pp. 55-76; Karl, Terry L. (1997) The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-
States, Berkley and London: California University Press; Tsui, Kevin K. (2011) “More Oil, Less Democracy: 
Evidence From Worldwide Crude Oil Discoveries”, The Economic Journal, Vol. 121, No. 551, pp. 89-115; 
Stevens, Paul (2003) “Resource Impact: Curse or Blessings? A literature survey”, Journal of Energy 
Literature, No. 9, Vol. 1, pp. 3-42; Davis, Graham A.; Tilton, John E. (2005) “The Resource Curse”, Natural 
Resources Forum, Vol. 29, No. 3, pp. 233-242. 
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FIGURE 1. “Countries by political regime type and resource dependency”10  
 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between mineral wealth and regime type. The figure 
charts countries based on their regime types by Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers Polity IV 
data, and countries marked with yellow dots indicate countries heavily dependent on 
mineral resource exports, based on data from World Bank. As we can see, half of the 
autocracies are heavily dependent on resources export. Moreover, 44% of resource-rich 
countries are labeled as strong autocracies, as compared to two resource-rich 
democracies out of 95 democratic countries (See Appendix 1).  
                                                             
10 Own compilation based on Marshall, Monty G.; Gurr, Ted R.; Jaggers, Keith (2011) „Polity IV Individual 
Country Regime Trends, 1946-2010”, Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 
1800-2011, (URL: http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm, accessed April 22, 2013) and fuel 
export percentage of merchandise exports data from World Bank,  
(URL: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/TX.VAL.FUEL.ZS.UN, accessed April 22, 2013). 
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2.Theoretical Framework 
 
This thesis presents an institutional approach for explaining the negative social and 
economic performance in resource abundant countries. I claim that taxation as a part of 
the general institutional framework has a great influence on democratic development. In 
the following chapter I will provide a general overview of the debate over the political 
economy of resource curse and a short empirical background for the reasons. I will 
concentrate more closely on the theory of rentierism and the “taxation effect”.  
2.1 The political economy of the resource curse 
 
It is clear, that revenues from natural resources create opportunities for countries to 
develop faster than they would otherwise do. However, except for a few cases, the 
natural resource rich countries have experienced lower economic growth and social 
performance than countries without natural resources – a phenomenon often referred to 
in academic literature as resource curse. The debate over how natural resources affect 
economic and social development is still relevant and receives significant academic 
attention. Although there is a general acceptance that natural resource abundant 
countries tend to perform economically worse, explanations for the reasons are still 
debatable. The debate is diversified by using different units for analyzing and by chosen 
methods and available data. All in all, for understandable reasons it is important to 
understand the reasons why natural resources undermine economic and social 
development, especially for countries struggling with resource wealth. Before, digging 
into the crucial concepts of this thesis, I will review the academic literature, both 
empirical and theoretical, for the reasons of economic and social undergoing in resource 
rich countries.  
Before we can continue, there has to be questioned if the resource curse really exist. The 
negative link between resource wealth and economic performance was demonstrated in 
the 1980s. However, the term was not proposed before 1993 by British economist 
Richard M. Auty to describe the social and economic undergoing of resource-rich 
11 
 
countries
11
. More recently, among other empirical researches, van der Ploeg gives a 
comprehensive overview of the effects of natural resources and emphasizes that the 
effects and outcomes of having natural resources varies considerably
12
. In this light, one 
of the first and most comprehensive studies in the field was carried through by Jeffrey 
D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner in “Natural Resource Abundance and Economic 
Growth”13. Analyzing ninety seven countries from 1971 to 1989 by using the share of 
exports of products in the gross national product, the results confirmed the negative 
relationship between economic development and resource abundance. Michael L. Ross, 
claims in his comprehensive analysis “Does Oil hinder Democracy?” that wealth from 
natural resources makes states less democratic. He argues that this idea has not been 
subjected to careful statistical tests, and is simply overlooked as an explanatory 
variable. Results from Kevin K. Tsui support Michael L. Ross findings. His article 
“More Oil, Less Democracy: Evidence from Worldwide Crude Oil Discoveries” 
concludes that discovering 100 billion barrels of oil lowers a countries democracy level 
by almost 20 percentage points below trend after three decades
14
. Taken into account 
the several number of scholar works and convincing empirical research, there is enough 
evidence to believe that the resource-rich countries follow different path of development 
and are struggling to use the natural wealth efficiently.  
There is a variety of literature analyzing the reasons for poor resource management 
resulting in low economic and social performance in resource abundant countries. 
Although the results have stayed fragmented we could allocate the explanations into 
four main categories. First, the earliest explanation emerged from explaining 
Netherlands`s negative economic performance after enormous oil discoveries in the 
North Sea. The approach, called “Dutch disease”, suggested more economic reasons 
for decreasing economic growth, emphasizing mainly the role of markets. In the core of 
the theory lies the non functioning linkage between resource and non-resource export 
                                                             
11 Auty, Richard M. (1993) Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies: The Resource Curse Thesis, 
London: Routledge. 
12 van der Ploeg, Frederick (2011) “Natural Resources: Curse or Blessing?” Journal of Economic 
Literature, Vol. 49, No.2, pp. 366-420. 
13 Sachs, Jeffrey D.; Warner, Andrew M. (1995) “Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth”, 
NBER Working Paper, No. 5398. 
14 Tsui, Kevin K. (2011) “More Oil, Less Democracy: Evidence From Worldwide Crude Oil Discoveries”, 
The Economic Journal, Vol. 121, No. 551, pp. 89-115. 
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sector. In other words, the theory of Dutch disease claims that exporting natural 
resources could strengthen a nation`s currency compared to other nations and making 
the manufacturing sector less competitive, resulting in low economical growth
15
.  
Several other approaches give social reasons more prominence. Ivar Kolstad and Arne 
Wiig refer to it as “decentralized explanations for resource curse”16, also titled as 
societal explanations by Ross
17
, concentrating on the incentives of the private or public 
agents outside the power elite. In the core of this approach lies the assumption that 
natural resources create a self-enrichment mentality. In other words, the rents from 
natural resources allure entrepreneurs in the productive sector to become rent seekers. 
There is a significant number of papers analyzing how the social mechanisms are 
causing the unproductive exploitation of rents. In this case, however, one of the main 
models by Mehlum, Moene and Torvik illustrates the idea with producers and grabbers 
equilibrium
18
. When producers enter the process of rent seeking, the opportunity cost 
(the next-highest-valued alternative use of that resource) declines, which evokes more 
grabbers. However, authors emphasize that the outcome of this equilibrium depends on 
the quality of institutions. Strong institutions are able to keep off the rent seeking even 
with increasing natural resources, while adding natural resources to this equilibrium 
with weak institutions creates more grabbers. Another example is provided by Ragnar 
Torvik showing the negative attraction of resource booms by reducing the number of 
entrepreneurs running productive, wealth creating firms in the public sector
19
. 
Thorvaldur Gylfason further exemplifies that the abundance of natural resources 
decreases investments especially in human capital, resulting in slow economic 
development
20
.  
                                                             
15
 For more look van der Ploeng, Frederick; Poelhekke, Steven (2009) „Volatility and the Natural 
Resource Curse“, Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 61, No. 61, pp. 727-760.  
16 Kolstad, Ivar; Wiig, Arne (2009) „Political Economy Models of the Resource Curse: Implications for 
Policy and Research“, Governance of Africa`s Resources Program, No. 40, pp. 1-19.  
17 Ross, Michael L. (1999) „The Political Economy of the Resource Curse“, World Politics, 51, pp. 297-322 
18 Mehlum, Halvor; Moene, Karl; Torvik, Ragnar (2006) „Institutions and the resource curse“, The 
Economic Journal, No. 116, pp. 1-20. 
19 Torvik, Ragnar (2001) „Natural resources, rent seeking and welfare“, Journal of Development 
Economics, Vol. 67, pp. 455-470. 
20 Gylfason, Thorvaldur (2001) „Natural resources, education and economic development“, European 
Economic Review, Vol. 45, pp. 847-859. 
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Thirdly, one modification of the previous approach is the cognitive explanation for 
resource curse, which contends that “resource booms produce a type of short–
sightedness among policymakers”21. Meaning, that instead of long-term development, 
immediate bounties are chosen. According to this approach, profitable resources 
generate competition that could control these and this, in turn, could lead to conflicts 
and rent seeking. This idea is supported by a comprehensive analysis by Eoin F. 
McGuirick who argues that new unearned revenues from oil selling create political 
competition and dysfunctional behavior. Leading powers use every means to secure 
their position and therefore the state’s development stays in the background. Others 
argue that natural resource abundance leads to greater corruption and inefficient 
bureaucracies. For example, the IMF working paper by Carlos Leite and Jens 
Weidmann argues that natural resource dependence causes not only economic 
slowdown but also makes countries more open to risk of violent conflict, greater 
inequality, less democracy and more corruption
22
. 
Fourthly, by far the most common and latest explanations for the resource curse have 
been political reasons or so-called state-centered approaches mixing cognitive, societal 
and institutional arguments, often referred to as theories of the rentier state. The 
institutions term has posed a great deal of scholarly attention. International Monetary 
Fund working paper by Andrei A. Levchenko defines institutions as “a wide range of 
social structure affecting economic outcomes: contract enforcement, property rights, 
shareholder protection, the political system and the like”23. Carlos Pareira and Vladimir 
Teles continue by saying that “political institutions, formal and informal, determine 
both the constraints and incentives faced by key players in a given society. The political 
institutions are capable of decreasing risks opportunistic behavior of political and 
economic players”24. Although a concrete definition for a “good political institution” is 
missing it is often referred to as institutions operating without patronage, rent-seeking, 
                                                             
21 Ross, Michel L. 1999: 298. 
22 Leite, Carlos; Weidmann, Jens (1999) “Does Mother Nature corrupt? Natural resources, corruption 
and economic growth“, IMF working paper 99/85. 
23 Levchenko, Andrei A. (2004) „Institutional Quality and International Trade“, IMF Working Paper, Vol. 
4, No. 231, p. 3. 
24
 Pereira, Carlos; Teles, Vladimir (2011) “Political Institutions, Economic Growth, and Democracy: The 
Substitute Effect“, Brookings, (URL: http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2011/01/19-political-
institutions-pereira, accessed May 9, 2013). 
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corruption and intimidation and their capacity to keep the rules of the contract. The 
Paradox of Plenty by Terry Lynn Karl explains, after analyzing six case studies, that 
natural resource wealth leads to impropriate fiscal reliance on petrodollars and public 
spending, resulting in destabilizing the regimes and weakening state institutions
25
. Kjetil 
Bjorvatn, Mohammad R. Farzanegan, and Friedrich Schneider modified these results 
and found a mountain of evidence of harmful effects of resource revenues in countries 
with weak governments. According to the authors, revenues are best used in countries 
with strong governments outperforming the strength of other institutions. “Indeed, with 
a strong government, resource wealth is likely to be growth enhancing, even when 
institutions are relatively weak”26.  
As previously illustrated, institutions are the key elements mediating the effects of 
natural resources to economic development. According to Ivar Kolstad and Arne Wiig 
the boundaries between decentralized and centralized approaches remain blurry
27
, 
meaning that there is no pure example of one of them. Analyzing centralized models 
require some variables from centralized models and vice versa. Michael L. Ross adds 
that decentralized models offer an easy and tempting way to explain the resource curse; 
however, this approach misses empirical proof
28
. It is very difficult to scientifically 
prove the incentives of decision makers and the connections between the wealth of 
revenues and the slow economic growth.  
In this thesis I will support the institutional approach to the resource curse. “Institutions 
constitute rules of the game that influence the positive and negative effects of resource 
rents and their relative dominance in a both centralized and decentralized political 
economy”29. The economic problem of a resource abundant country is not only the 
question how to manage resources but also how to secure the best use of resources. And 
this is done by strong and transparent institutions. Next, I will take a closer look on the 
rentier state theory and, later, present the effects of institutional inability to fiscal 
capacity. 
                                                             
25 Karl, Terry L. (1997) The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States (Studies in International 
Political Economy), University of California Press. 
26 Bjorvatn, Kjetil; Farzanegan, Mohammad R.; Schneider, Friedrich 2012: 1308. 
27
 Kolstad, Ivar; Wiig, Arne 2009: 9. 
28 Ross, Michael L. 1999: 310. 
29 Kolstad, Ivar; Wiig, Arne 2009: 15. 
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2.2 Theory of rentierism 
 
Before we can learn how tax systems influence the political regime in natural resource 
wealthy countries we have to understand the concept of “rentierism” and “rentier state”. 
The concept has raised several intellectual debates; however mutual agreement on how 
to define rentierism/rentier state is still missing. The concept of the “rentier state” was 
first postulated by Hussain Mahdavy with respect to pre-revolutionary Pahlavi Iran in 
1970, since then it has been widely used to refer to mainly oil-rich countries in the Arab 
world
30
. The theory refers to countries which derive a substantial part of their revenue 
from external economic rent. In a broader sense the rent is understood as “the income 
derived from the gift of nature”31. In this light, every country is considered more or less 
a rentier state. Understanding more social function behind this idea, the concept was 
revisited by Hazem Beblawi. Author of The Rentier State in the Arab World suggested 
that for a country to be identified as a rentier state it has to fulfill four basic elements
32
. 
Firstly, based on its predecessor, Beblawi stated that the rent situation has to 
predominate. However, the author admits that the percentage remains a matter of 
judgment. Secondly, the rents are paid by foreign actors and therefore can sustain 
without a strong domestic production sector. Thirdly, while these two previous 
conditions constitute a rentier economy, in order to become a rentier state only a few 
are engaged in the generation of this rent (wealth) and the majority are only involved in 
the distribution or utilization of it. This means that the creation of general wealth is in 
the hands of a very limited group. Last but not least, the main receiver and the benefiter 
is the state government. This means that economic power is closely linked to political 
power, which gives governments the possibility to distribute wealth within their own 
best interests.  
                                                             
30 Yates, Douglas A. (1996) The Rentier State in Africa: Oil Rent Dependency and neocolonialism in the 
Republic of Cabon, Threnton, NY: Africa World Press, p. 11. 
31
 Marshall, Alfred (1920) Principles of Economics, London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd, 8
th
 edition, p. 350. 
32 Beblawi, Hazem (1987) “The Rentier State in the Arab World”, The Rentier State, edited by Beblawi, 
Hazem and Luciani, Giacomo, Croom Helm, pp. 51-52. 
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Hussain Mahdavy was mainly interested in cases in which “effects of the oil sector are 
significant and yet the rest of the economy is not of secondary importance”33. Also, 
Hazem Beblawi argues that although, the rentierism is mostly seen in oil rich countries, 
the concept is not exclusively about oil. However, not all natural resources produce 
rents for the country. The author of the Crude Democracy Thad Dunning defines natural 
resources that produce rents as resources that are geographically concentrated, generally 
capital-intensive in production, and pose high barriers to entry for many private actors. 
Resources that produce rents are relatively easy for the state to tax, and taxing these 
sectors generally does not involve separating a wide swatch of citizens from their 
private income
34
. In this sense, being dependent on exporting natural resources like 
coffee beans or fruits does not count as rentierism. Last of all, although the concept of 
rentierism stays arbitrary, we can see that the main characteristic ground for 
rentierism/rentier state is the rentier mentality, which refers to the broken classical 
economic concept of work-reward causality.  
There are three commonly accepted causal mechanisms underlying the argument that 
rentierism harms democracy. First, the “rentier effect” implies that rentier states have a 
“blessed position” thanks to financial autonomy. Michael L. Ross distinguishes three 
sub-categories. The “taxation effect” claims that governments derive sufficient 
revenues from the sale of oil and therefore do not tend to tax the population very 
heavily. The “spending effect”, claiming that resource wealth may lead to greater 
spending on patronage, which in turn deepens the pressure for democratization
35
. Last 
but not least, the “group formation” effect. Ross argues, that secured with revenues, the 
government tries to prevent the formation of social groups that are independent from the 
state and hence that would be inclined to demand political rights
36
. However, the 
freedom from levying taxes “release[s] the state from the accountability ordinarily 
exacted by domestic appropriation of surplus. “…The state may be virtually completely 
autonomous from its society, winning popular acquiescence through distribution rather 
                                                             
33 Mhadavy, Hossain (1970) “The Pattern and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier States: The 
Case of Iran“, Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East: From the Rise of Islam to the Present 
Day, edited by Cook, Michael Allan, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 431. 
34
 Dunning, Thad 2008: 28. 
35 Ross, Michael L. 2001: 333. 
36 Ross, Michael L. 2001: 334. 
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than support through taxation and representation
37”. The second causal mechanism 
could be called the “repression effect”, which implies states have a capacity to buy off 
and repress the opposition. This also refers to greater military expenditures in securing 
the regime. According to Michael Herb, these two previous mechanisms could be 
brought under the concept of “rentier social contract”, meaning that the state provides 
goods and services to society, who will in turn provide state officials with a degree of 
autonomy in decision-making
38
. The third causal mechanism is called the 
“modernization effect”, which argues that resource revenues limit socioeconomic 
changes. This means that oil-driven development often has an influence on state-market 
relations and deviate the balance redundantly towards the state.  
In this paper I will support the first claim that resource wealth causes governments to 
perform poorly in economic development because of a “blessed” economic situation. In 
the following part I will continue with “taxation effect” in more detail. Governments are 
responsible for implementing taxation systems and by doing so increase the demand for 
democratic accountability. However, in the rentier economy, which refers to an 
economy where revenue is more of an “occurred” rent than an “earned” income39, the 
wealth is concentrated around a small fraction of the society and, blessed with financial 
autonomy, they are not willing to give up their privileges.  
2.3 Taxation and political regimes 
 
In the following section I will take a look at the linkage between taxation and level of 
democracy in resource abundant countries. I will argue that taxation as a secondary 
factor within an institutional approach has influence on the social outcome, however, 
not as strong as political institutions themselves. 
 The common belief that taxes can foster a democracy lies in the interpretation of 
political development in early modern Europe and colonial America
40
. Foremost it 
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refers to modern European history, when monarchies were obliged to hand over some of 
their authority to parliamentary institutions, in exchange for the ability to raise new 
taxes. Until 16
th
 century the sovereignty of monarchies in Europe was derived from 
their own private properties. While missing the right to tax, the falling of feudal 
organizations and the state`s increasing military expenditures raised the need for extra 
income. However, taxing was not thinkable without giving citizens back some social 
securities. No matter what the taxes were used for – to cope with emergencies above 
with war, the monarchy had to give up some degree of power. Adding a public sphere to 
the ruling of the state gave birth to the modern state. Many scholars of US history bring 
up the example of the Revolutionary War in 1760s, when the British government 
introduced three new measures to collect more taxes. In order to cover the Seven Years 
War the Sugar Act, the Stamp Act and the New Townshend levies were implemented. 
Most historians believe that this taxation without consent lead to rebellions, boycotts 
and organized resistance which helped to produce riots that finally resulted in 
independence and governments with strong representative institutions. In other words, 
this bargaining with the authority for tax contribution lead the way for a modern 
democracy with representative institutions. Keeping this in mind, it is no surprise that 
“in many countries voting rights have been linked to tax contributions, both rhetorically 
and practically“41.  
This previously described fiscal sociology paradigm is advanced by Joseph Schumpeter. 
In the early twentieth century Schumpeter developed a theory that claimed taxation was 
central to state-building. The general assumption is that „the budget is the skeleton of 
the state stripped of all misleading ideologies“42 other than democracy. In other words, 
the fiscal pressure of the state reshapes the people and government. However, it does 
not mean that the fundamental change in the social structure could be brought out by 
changing the structure of revenues, rather it reflects that the state`s nature has changed 
and attitudes toward life and its culture cannot stay the same. According to Schumpeter, 
this sharing authority and the responsibilities had several benefits for both sides. 
However, this consensual path tended to benefit rulers only in the long run. In the short 
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42 Schumpeter, Joseph (1991) Crisis of the Tax State, Springer, US, p. 7.  
19 
 
term they took the risk of sharing power and decisions. But most importantly, „rulers 
dependent on taxes developed a stake in the prosperity of (some of) their citizens and 
therefore faced incentives to promote that prosperity, which, in turn, would generate 
more revenues and strengthen the state“43.  
The linkage between fiscal policy and political regime has generated great empirical 
analysis. Although the positive effect on the regime is commonly posed, the empirical 
assessments come to different conclusions and empirical proof has stayed modest. José 
Antonio Cheibub has analyzed the problem of different taxation systems in different 
political regimes. His “Political Regimes and the extractive Capacity of Governments: 
Taxation in Democracies and Dictatorships” finds support for the claim that taxes tend 
to be higher in democracies than in dictatorships. However, the author admits, that “we 
should not infer that this is due to any inherent feature of democratic regimes”44. 
Meaning that differences in the taxation systems in different political regimes are not 
brought upon the inability to collect taxes efficiently. Both democracies and 
dictatorships are capable of collecting taxes equally and the differences lie somewhere 
else. Lead by this, Eoin F. McGuirck used micro-level data from public opinion surveys 
across sub-Saharan countries and to find clear evidence in support of the “resource rents 
lower the taxation burden” hypothesis. Eoin F. McGuirick argues that an “increase in 
resource rents lowers perceived tax enforcement, which itself is a significant predicator 
of the demand for accountability (a one point increase in perceived tax enforcement 
raises the demand for accountability by around third of a point. Both are measured on 
four-point scales)
45
. These results are also supported by “Sovereign rents and quality of 
tax policy and administration” by Stephen Knack who finds plenty of evidence for the 
claim that resource revenues reduce the quality of the taxation system
46
. Michael L. 
Ross also raises the question between taxation and democracy in a comprehensive 
research “Does Taxation Lead to Representation”. The main question is whether 
democracies have a higher taxation burden since they produce more representation or 
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not? The author concludes that there is no connection between higher taxes and social 
outcome. Works by Paola Profeta, Ricardo Puglisi and Simona Scabrosetti
47
 and the 
„Rentier Wealth, Unruly Law, and the Rise of Opposition“ by Gwenn Okruhlik 48 did 
not find any significant correlation between tax revenue and democratic institutions or 
the protection of the civic liberties. Similarly to José Antonio Cheibub, Ross finds that 
if taxation has a catalytic effect for a democracy, there is a critical ambiguity, in the 
sense that it is unclear “whether democracy is linked to a higher absolute tax burden 
(“pure anti tax” model), or a higher tax burden relative to the services the government 
provides (“cost-benefit” model)49”. However, there seems to be strong support for a 
higher tax burden relative to the services the government provides. In other words, it 
suggests that taxes in general do not have a democratic effect but a rise in the 
government`s expenditures is linked to the level of democracy. An increase in the 
government`s services brings more democracy. Therefore, “measures that help 
authoritarian governments lower the price of government services will, ceteris paribus, 
tend to have anti-democratic effects; policies that force them to raise the price of 
government services will tend to have pro-democratic effects”50. These results are 
modified by Kevin M. Morrison who argues that externally obtained revenues have a 
stabilizing power, in a sense these revenues enable a democratic or autocratic regime 
tostay in power by whatever, means are best for the regime. “The causal mechanisms 
are that this revenue provides the regime with a greater ability to appease citizens, and 
thereby prevent a revolution or transition to democracy”51. Meaning that democracies 
provide elites with lower taxes and autocracies provide society with more social 
securities. Jørgen J. Andersen also tested the influence of oil revenues on government 
spending and after conducting an unbalanced panel of 63 democratic countries, in the 
period 1970 – 2001 he concludes that changes in the governmental revenue have effect 
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only for the presidential government expenditures but not for presidential parliamentary 
expenditures
52
.  
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Political Economy, Vol. 27, p. 306. 
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3. Research design 
 
For better understanding of the effects of taxation for political regimes, I will execute an 
empirical analysis. In order to test the main hypothesis I will make three secondary 
hypotheses. First, I claim that resource-wealthy countries have different taxation 
systems. Second, mineral-rich countries tend to be more autocratic, since citizens are 
not made sufficiently accountable by the taxation system. Last, but not least, I argue that 
personal income is influenced by the type of political regime. The following chapter 
will give a detailed overview of the hypothesis, methods for testing them and used data. 
3.1. Hypothesis and methods for testing them 
 
By analyzing the linkage between taxation and level of democracy, I presuppose that 
rents from natural resources provide governments with economical autonomy, that they 
are not in need to extract taxes from citizens as heavily as resource-poor countries and 
therefore have a greater negative effect on social outcome. This research question is 
derived amongst others from the previously mentioned Joseph Schumpeter “fiscal 
sociology” and also Samuel L. Huntington`s argument in his The Third Wave: 
Democratization in the Late 20
th
 Century - “the lower the level of taxation, the less 
reason for the public to demand representation”53. In order to test the relationship 
between taxation and the political regime, a careful empirical analysis is needed.  
Hypothesis #1: Resource-wealthy countries have a different taxation system 
To start with, I will take a closer look at what the relationship between the tax system 
and personal income in countries rich in natural resources is. I assume that mineral 
wealthy countries have more financial autonomy and less immediate pressure to collect 
taxes from citizens. This raises the question whether resource wealthy countries tax the 
population on the same basis as resource-poor countries? If not, there is great reason to 
believe that the revenues from the sale of natural resources allow the government 
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financial independence from its taxpayers` money, thus setting the stage for decreased 
democracy.  
Hypothesis #2: Mineral-rich countries tend to be more autocratic, since citizens are not 
made sufficiently accountable by the taxation system 
Do resource-rich countries follow the same rules in tax systems as resource-poor 
countries? By asking this I will check the “taxation effect” claim for the year 2010. It 
suggests that when the government gathers sufficient revenues from the sale of oil, it 
tends to be less reliant on its tax payers and the public in turn will be less likely to 
demand accountability from – and representation from – their government54. 
Hypothesis #3: The type of political regime influences personal income 
In order to control previous results I will analyze how personal income is influenced by 
the regime. If resource-rich countries are more likely to be associated with inefficient 
tax-systems it will result in a negative impact on personal income. As a result of the low 
productivity of private investments and business. 
3.2 Data and methodology 
 
In this thesis resource-wealthy countries are indicated by share of minerals export in 
merchandise export (%) by World Bank (SITC section 3). According to the United 
Nations Statistics Division these minerals are coal, coke and briquettes, petroleum, 
petroleum products and related materials, gas (natural and manufactured) and electric 
current
55
. I have analyzed the share of exports of natural resources, since it expresses the 
dependency of resource exportation and because revenues from this export are the main 
source for the governmental budget. It’s a matter of variety in a country’s exports, not to 
become over dependent on fluctuations in a single product’s price on international 
market. I have listed moderate resource dependent countries whose export of natural 
resources from merchandise exports is between 30-50% and heavily dependent 
resource-rich countries, where export of natural resources constitutes more than 50% of 
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merchandised exports. By doing this, many resource-rich countries like Australia, 
Canada, United Kingdom, United States of America are not included in this analysis, 
since the export of fuels remains under 30 % of merchandise exports.  
Do resource-wealthy countries tax the population on the same basis or not? To test this 
claim, I use the variable “logincome1000” measured as the natural log of per capita 
Gross National Income (GNI) in 2010 with data from the World Bank
56
. This indicator 
developed by the World Bank reflects the average income of a country’s citizens and 
since the indicator is closely linked with other important indicators that measure the 
social, economic, and environmental well-being, it decently reflects the general 
economical strength. The second variable “taxes % GDP”, which indicates annual % of 
revenue taxes from countries` GDP with data collected by IMF in 2010 (Graph 1). It is 
important to point out that the data of the tax revenues creates great obstacles for this 
thesis. The data has been unpublished for many main resource exporting countries, 
since it might be considered sensitive data. In order to cover more countries this thesis 
includes the latest data for available from 2010. (See full data for “taxes as percentage 
of GDP” Appendix 2) 
Secondly, I will analyze whether countries with higher taxes tend to be more democratic 
and where natural resource-rich countries are positioned? I assume that mineral rich 
countries tend to be more autocratic, since citizens are left out by the taxing system. Do 
countries with higher personal taxes tend to be more democratic or not, keeping in mind 
the “taxation effect”? Is it true, that democratic countries combine more citizens into 
governing the state than autocratic countries? To test this claim I correlated the type of 
regime (“autdem”) and tax revenue percentage of GDP (taxes%GDP) (Graph 2). For 
„autdem“ variable I used Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers PolitiyIV data for the year 2010. 
The Polity IV dataset covers all the major independent states in the global system, (i. e., 
states with total population of 500, 000 or more in the year 2010 164 countries) over the 
period 1800 – 201057. I believe this data reflects the nature of the regime better than the 
alternative Freedom House Index, since the latter reflects only the individual and 
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political freedoms. Measuring narrowly the attributes of regime themselves, Polity IV 
gives more direct measure of how representative a regime is. Since Marshall, Gurr and 
Jaggers` data consists of two data sets which evaluate the democracy and autocracy I 
co-bound these data’s by subtracting country’s autocracy score from its democracy 
score, and recalibrating the resulting – 10 to + 10 scale to a 0 to 10 scale, where 10 
represents a full democracy and 0 a full autocracy.  
Thirdly, how is the personal income affected by the regime in resource-wealthy 
countries? In order to control previous results, I checked how personal income and type 
of regime interacts with each other. Do revenue windfalls have an effect on income 
growth or not? For that purpose I correlated variable “autdem” data from Marshall, Gurr 
and Jaggers Polity IV for 2010 and variable “LogIncome1000” data from World Bank 
for year 2010 (Graph 3). 
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4. Results and discussion 
 
In the following chapter I will analyze the results in depth. After carrying through an 
empirical research the results show that the relationship between taxation and political 
regime is not linear and the link is not as significant as one would expect. 
4.1 Hypothesis #1: Resource-wealthy countries have a different 
taxation system 
 
The “logincome1000” vs. “Taxes% GDP” scatter plot (Graph 1) indicates that resource-
rich countries tend to establish a different kind of taxation systems compared to 
resource-poor countries. Resource-rich countries tend to have higher incomes and less 
heavy taxation. Above the best fit line we could only find Norway, Algeria and Bolivia, 
all other resource-wealthy countries stay below the best fit line. Below the best fit line 
there are 13 resource-rich countries, which is more than 9% of total countries presented 
in this correlation. Countries with fuel export 30-50% of merchandise exports totaled 
over 2 percentage points and countries with more than 50% of fuel export totaled 5 
percentage points below the best fit line (See Table 1). Based on that we could claim 
that in mineral-rich countries (export more than 30% of merchandise exports), a higher 
income translates to lower taxes. However, in mineral-poor countries a higher income 
means higher taxes. This slightly confirms our expectations that resource-rich countries 
rely more on resource revenues than on established taxes. Although there are some 
deviations, e.g. Algeria. We can see that Algeria relates more to resource-poor countries 
with a relatively high personal income and established high taxation burden. A more 
closer look is needed to understand the reasons for such unusual linkage between 
taxation system and level of democracy. An analytical explanation will be given in next 
subchapter. 
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GRAPH 1. „Taxes as percent of GDP vs. Log of Income in 1000 USD“ 
 
TABLE 1. “ The position of natural resource exporting countries”  
Fuel export % Fuel Export 30 – 50% Fuel export 50 – 100% 
Countries (136)   
Above best fit line 1 2 
Below best fit line 4 9 
 Total: 5 Total: 11 
Mean   
Above best fit line 0,735 1,470 
Below best fit line 2,941 6,618 
 Percentage points: 2,21 Percentage points: 5,148 
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4.1.1 Explaining Algeria 
 
In Graph 1, as well as on other graphs, as we will see later, Algeria presents an odd 
deviation from our general tendency, which requires some explanation. After the 
discovery of Algeria’s first mineral resource fields Edelleh and Hassi Messaoud in 1956 
the hydrocarbons` sector has remained the backbone of Algeria’s economy. There are 
3.4 billion cubic meters of proven natural gas reserves and 12.20 billion barrels in 
recoverable reserves of crude oil
58
. Algeria is currently producing 1.27 million barrels 
of crude oil per day. With 4 percent of proven global reserves of natural gas, Algeria 
ranks fifth in the world; moreover, only 17 percent of the reserves have been 
exploited
59
. Besides hydrocarbons, Algeria boasts resources like zinc, phosphates, 
uranium and mercury. All this raises the question, why has this resource-wealthy 
country deviated from the general rentier state theory? Algeria’s position on the scatter 
plot raises several questions. Firstly, while scored as an “open autocracy”, tax revenues 
involve a notable part of the Algerian financial budget. Secondly, although fuel exports 
constitute more than 97% of Algerian merchandise exports, it has established an 
extremely high tax burden. Algeria’s tax percentage of GDP is even higher than the tax 
burden in the resource-rich democracy of Norway. Algeria has enormous amounts of 
natural resources, an open anocracy and, against all odds, a heavy tax burden. In this 
sense, Algeria’s case undermines the “rentier state” theory and its basic claim that 
resource-wealth implies low taxation rates that might hinder democracy.  
This topic has received relatively little academic attention and, therefore, many 
unanswered questions remain. Clement M. Henry argues in his article “Algeria’s 
Agonies: Oil Rent Effects in a Bunker State” that “Algeria seems to be a wretched 
poster child for this rentier theory of the petrostate”60. The author sees the reasons for 
the failing of the rentier state theory more in the historical perspective than having 
natural resources itself. According to Henry, discovering oil in 1956 had no influence 
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on Algeria’s political and economical development, since the development of civil 
society during colonial period occurred long before the discovery of oil. In a 
comprehensive comparison with neighboring country Tunisia sharing the same colonial 
legacy, Henry concludes that although sharing very similar conditions, the main 
difference lies in the origins of their respective elites. “The struggle against colonial rule 
enhanced the prestige of the educated elite in Tunisia and deepened its political and 
social intermediaries, whereas the liberation of Algeria completed the destruction of 
Algeria’s elites and civil society”61. Having been a colony under French rule for 132 
years destroyed the intermediaries of traditional elites and civil society without giving 
rise to new ones. On the contrary, the new social order was mainly based on clans of 
friends and cousins. Therefore, the trained and skilled French laborforce leaving Algeria 
left the country in economic chaos.  
For these reasons, Algeria remains significantly autonomous compared to other 
resource-wealthy countries, so much so that we could consider it to be more of a 
“bunker state” - a country led with military support and with a potential for civil war. In 
this sense, we can see that the leaders of Algeria enjoy much more autonomy than other 
resource rich countries in the region. The need for controlling has created the situation 
where all the spheres of state, especially the economy, have been subjected to the ruling 
powers. They could be seen as instruments of the state and therefore serving the needs 
and interests of the government. According to Valerie Marcel, we can distinguish two 
types of national oil companies. Ones with ready access to capital and those without. 
Algeria’s national oil company Sonatrach (Enterprise National Sonatrach) represents the 
companies that sell the crude oil they produce and retain earnings after paying their 
government and shareholders the royalties, tax on profits and dividends owed
62
. 
Although being able to finance its own projects, this national company stays under high 
state influence. Furthermore, in these bunker states, trade unions and business 
associations exist but are not permitted to acquire autonomous roots that might render 
them accountable to the general populations”63. Industries in bunker states act as 
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political intermediaries for the ruling power. Meaning that many scholars have referred 
to this unconventional decision process as a “mafia type of industrialism”.  
According to Clement Moore and Henry Robert Springbor there are altogether six 
countries that could be called bunker states. Besides Algeria also Saddam Hussein’s 
Iraq, Qaddafi’s Libya, Omar al-Bashir’s Sudan, Bashar al-Assad’s Syria, and Abd 
Rabbuh Mansur al-Hadi’s Yemen64. The aim of these states is to marginalize the private 
sector and limit the freedom of information or autonomy of economic action. Scholars 
see the reasons for this in the historical perspective and in the unconventional path of 
development of civil society rather than having the natural resources itself.  
Leaving behind the historical point of view, what could be the reasons for Algeria being 
odd variation in its fiscal policy? After several attempts to liberalize the economy from 
the heavily centralized system and attract foreign investments, encourage domestic 
savings and investments, the mafia type decision-making legacy is hard to wash away. 
Although the Algerian government has expressed their interests to liberalize its 
economy the top-down decision perspective is still dominating and the outcome will be 
heavily dependent on the oil price in the global market. John P. Enteils argues in his 
article that Algeria is extremely dependent on oil prices. The author calls it pendulum 
swinging – during low prices of oil, Algeria has sought to attract investments, to push 
market reforms and push efficiency, but as soon as the price rises the government 
withdraws all the changes
65
. Only one example of this push-and pull strategy is the 
Algerian Hydrocarbons Reform Bill of 2005 and the subsequent changes to this 
legislation.  
In order to liberalize the economy, more than 450 state-owned enterprises, including 
banks were granted with autonomy to two-thirds of the companies. Also, state 
controlled monopolies for import were opened to foreign and domestic companies. 
However, after Egypt`s mobile phone operator Osasco’s decision to sell cement plants 
to France in 2007, Algeria established several constraints for foreign investors. Since 
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then, foreign investors can own only 49% of any Algerian company and cannot buy real 
estate for constructing factories. By now the privatization process has slowed down due 
to a general lack of interests among foreign investors and a lack of confidence among 
government leaders. Foreign investors are faced with unpredictabilities and enormous 
bureaucracy when doing business. Measures are often imposed suddenly and without 
consulting with the business community. Moreover, the Word Bank ranked Algeria as 
no. 152 in ease of doing business in 2012. 
According to U.S & Foreign Commercial Service and U.S Department of State it is 
estimated that 50 percent of Algeria’s economy is informal66. This means that about half 
of the economy is not reflected on the tax level. Furthermore, approximately 10 
percentage of the population is unemployed. The non-oil sector has experienced strong 
growth, averaging 6 percent a year between 2003 – 2007, but the oil and gas sector is 
still the backbone of the economy. Fuel revenues in 2010 represented 97 percent of 
exports, whereas hydrocarbon rents composed only 31% of the GDP. Since oil is the 
main and most profitable export article in Algeria, I have hereby used the percentage of 
oil rents of GDP.  
This means that although mineral export dominates in the merchandise export, the 
proportion of hydrocarbons out of total GDP is rather low compared to other resource-
rich countries. The economy is still poorly diversified and as we can see in the Table 2 
the oil income out of total GDP is rather low, forcing it to depend on higher taxes. 
Taxes established include progressive personal income tax rates up to 35% on amounts 
over DZD 1.44million per annum and corporate profits tax, which was 45% on 
distributed profits and 20% on reinvested earnings. 
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TABLE 2. “Countries with highest oil as share of GDP and countries with highest 
minerals as share of exports”  
Oil rents  
(% of GDP) 
2010 Fuel exports  
(% of merchandise exports) 
2010 
Iraq 69,1 Algeria 97 
Congo, Rep. 61,6 Azerbaijan 95 
Saudi Arabia 50,5 Venezuela, RB 93 
Equatorial Guinea 47,3 Yemen, Rep. 91 
Gabon 46,4 Saudi Arabia 87 
Angola 46,1 Nigeria 87 
Azerbaijan 42,6 Oman 81 
Chad 41,2 Bahrain 74 
Nigeria 29,5 Iran, Islamic Rep. 71 
Kazakhstan 22,4 Congo, Rep. 68 
Ecuador 20,2 Trinidad and Tobago 66 
Turkmenistan 19,7 Russian Federation 64 
Yemen, Rep. 19,0 Norway 64 
Sudan 18,5 Colombia 60 
United Arab Emirates 18,0 Ecuador 55 
Venezuela, RB 18,0 Syrian Arab Republic 50 
Algeria 17,6 Cameroon 50 
 
 
In conclusion, Algeria is an odd case, I quite do not resolve here. It enjoys great benefits 
from selling hydrocarbons, a high taxation rate and is autocratic at the same time. This 
triangle of indicators is beyond the rentierism theory. Although a comprehensive 
analysis on Algeria’s case is out of the scope this thesis I propose possible explanation 
to be in the historical perspective of the bunker state theory. It would be interesting to 
analyze the other bunker states, however, data for all other previously named bunker 
countries is not available(!). Also, it is worth noting that oil revenues compose under 
20% of Algeria’s GDP, which implies that income from fuels is not sufficient and 
higher taxes are needed.  
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4.2 Hypothesis #2: Mineral-rich countries tend to be more autocratic, 
since citizens are not made sufficiently accountable by the taxation 
system  
 
The following subchapter analyzes whether countries with higher taxes tend to be more 
democratic and what we can say about natural resource- rich countries. In Graph 2 we 
can see that there is no pattern for mineral-healthy countries, although more heavily 
resource dependent countries tend to have less democracy and a lower tax system. More 
than 6% of resource-rich countries have variable “autdem”<0 (tendency to be more 
autocratic ) (See Table 3). These results implicate that more autocracies with natural 
resources tend to have lower taxes than countries with poor natural resources. Most of 
the heavily resource-exporting countries tend to be autocratic and with a low tax system 
(autdem<0). Less heavily resource-exporting countries tend to be more democratic 
along with an average tax system. However, countries with autdem>0 tend to have no 
natural resources and a higher tax system. In this graph, Algeria’s case again raises 
interest. If my general hypothesis is correct, Algeria’s heavy tax burden should qualify 
as a full democracy. However, in this case it is considered a semi-democracy. 
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GRAPH 2. „Taxes as percent of GDP vs. Regime Type“ 
 
 
TABLE 3 “ Natural minerals exporting countries by regime type”  
 autdem>0 autdem<0 
Total: 116 countries   
Fuel export 30 – 50%  3 1 
Mean -  0,86 
Fuel export 50 – 100% 4 8 
Mean -  6,90 
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4.3 Hypothesis #3: the type of political regime influences personal 
income  
 
Hypothesis #3 analyzed the relationship of how personal income is influenced by the 
regime type, especially in resource abundant countries.  
Graph 3 seems to demonstrate a slight C-shaped pattern. For high “autdem”, democracy 
increases as income increases. Yet for low “autdem”, democracy decreases as income 
increases. Most of the countries in this group are heavily dependent on resource export, 
so one could propose that the more a state receives mineral export funds the more it can 
ignore popular demands, because it does not extract taxes from people and can buy off a 
sufficient number of people in order to avoid resistance. However, there are some odd 
deviations. There are resource-poor countries that follow the pattern of resource-
wealthy countries. It is worth pointing out that these countries with autocratic 
tendencies and with higher incomes are mostly relatively small countries mainly located 
in Africa. More interestingly, 11 countries out of 16 have not published their tax 
revenue percentage after 2010 (See Appendix 2).  
It is worth pointing out that personal average income per capita gross national income 
(GNI) creates some obstacles. While reflecting well the general economic performance 
of countries, the indicator of income as a country’s final income in a year divided by its 
population does not reflect how the wealth is produced. How much could be private 
business or state owned? In this case it could be crucial. Taking into account the value 
added by all resident producers plus any product taxes, the GNI per capita does not say 
anything about such distribution. Finding this kind of data is extremely complicated and 
stays out of the scope of this thesis. However, taking a closer look at Graph 3 gives us 
reason to believe that in the top right corner NOR, POR,SLV, GR may have a relatively 
low state ownership and in the bottom right corner of the Graph 3, on the other hand, 
KUW, QAT, UAE, BAH, SAU, OMAN may be inclined to have more state ownership. 
This gives us reason to believe that the wealth generated by the private sector has 
greater democratic influence than wealth distributed by state-owned sector.  
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GRAPH 3. “ Regime Type vs. personal income as per capita GNI “  
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5. Case study 
 
The presented analytical research paints a complex picture of the relationship between 
political regime and applied fiscal system in resource-wealthy countries. In order to test 
the results of my thesis, I have selected three countries – Norway, Venezuela and Qatar. 
Case analysis selection was based on methodological reasons and to have examples 
from different regions of the world. First, Norway represents a counter-example to the 
whole study. Unlike most resource dependent countries, Norway represents a strong 
mature democracy with a high level oil fund transparency, which does not support 
misuse and corruption. Venezuela, on the other hand, represents an ideological 
dimension. The country has transformed from autocracy to democracy and is showing a 
tendency of leaning towards autocracy again. Last, but not least, the case of Qatar 
differs from others significantly. Qatar has not been ruled by any ideological 
movements but has remained a strong stagnant autocracy. Furthermore, Venezuela and 
Qatar have experienced a considerably erratic fiscal system so we can analyze the 
taxation effect simultaneously on a country with a democratic and autocratic 
background. Secondly, I have considered geographical variation. As stated previously, 
rentier state theory has not applied strictly to oil countries in the Middle East. I have 
limited the work to countries that could provide a more general analysis. Thirdly, I 
considered the importance to the global energy market. Norway, Venezuela and Qatar 
are included since they are among the most significant players in the fuel sector.  
Analyzing the fiscal policy and type of regime on a micro level poses some major 
obstacles. Cross country data for taxation burden over time is missing some crucial 
information. However, in order to retain the coherence with the general model, I use the 
same data from World Bank and Polity IV by Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers used earlier in 
our model building.  
5.1 Norway 
 
The case of Norway displays as an anomaly to the “resource undermines democracy” 
claim. Although discovering massive resources of petroleum reserves in the North Sea 
in the late 1960s and 1970s, resource wealth has not influenced Norway`s democratic 
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development. According to Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers Polity IV data Norway is 
indicated as a full democracy before and after discovering oil reserves without any 
exceptions. Furthermore, Norway has managed to transform oil revenues into an 
economic success story. Although one can claim that Norway had the fortune to 
discover oil reserves after becoming a mature democracy with developed institutions 
and competent bureaucracy, many scholars have claimed petroleum has even improved 
Norway`s economical performance. Erling Røed Larsen argues in his research 
“Escaping the Resource Curse and the Dutch Disease? When and Why Norway Caught 
up with and Forged Ahead of Its Neighbors” that Norway is a significant example 
because before discovering oil in 1960s the country’s gross domestic product per capita 
was much lower compared to other Scandinavian countries
67
. The economical 
acceleration started a few years after discovering oil and today Norway is one of the 
richest countries in the world by cross domestic product at purchasing power parity per 
capita (GDP (PPP)) passing all neighboring countries. Therefore, Norway has proved 
that natural resources might not necessarily have democracy- undermining features. On 
the contrary, natural resources might play a crucial role for democratic development.  
How does the case of Norway relate to this thesis? Norway represents a true anomaly to 
Hypothesis #1, which argued that resource-rich countries apply a different kind of fiscal 
policy than resource-poor countries. In Graph 1 we can see that resource-rich countries 
do not tend to follow the pattern of resource-poor countries with the exception of 
Norway. Heavily oil- dependent Norway follows the pattern of resource-poor countries 
more than natural-resource-rich countries. Having a relatively high personal high 
income per capita, Norway has a high taxation burden like many resource-poor 
countries. In other words, Norway has not let oil influence the previously established 
taxation burden in order to keep the demand for political accountability.  
Which brings us to Hypothesis #2, according to which the presence of large resource 
rents tends to reduce the burden of taxation on citizens in order to reduce accountability. 
In Graph 2 we can see how Norway opposes Hypothesis #2. Heavily resource-
dependent Norway has introduced a high taxation burden for citizens, resulting in 
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democratic accountability. In order to stay coherent with the general research model 
presented in this thesis I used the same Polity IV and taxation as a percentage of 
domestic gross product data by World Bank. Unfortunately, there is no information 
about taxation burden available since the major oil reserve discoveries in 1969, 
therefore data available from 2000 – 2010 were used. As can be seen from Graph 4, the 
tax burden in Norway has lingered between 25-30% of GDP without any change in 
regime. The limited data provided by World Bank, Polity IV and Graph 4 gives us great 
reason to believe that the taxation system did not influence the stable regime. Also, the 
following explanation provides us with clear evidence in support of a positive 
relationship between the taxation burden and regime type in resource-rich Norway.  
GRAPH 4 “Relationship between taxes as a percentage of GDP and political 
regime in Norway in 2000 – 2010”68 
 
 
How can we explain these results? As already noted, Norway had a privileged position 
when it entered its oil era, with a mature full democracy and bureaucratic institutions 
with experience of regulating other natural resources-dependent sectors such as 
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hydroenergy, fishing and mining. Norway had a functioning industry and low 
unemployment. For these reasons, Mark C. Thurber and Benedicte T. Istad conclude in 
their research “Norway`s evolving Champion: Statoil and the politics of state 
enterprise” that “Norway`s orientation [dealing with resources] was different from 
almost all of the other nations that came into petroleum riches, with a balance of risk 
and reward that tilted more in the direction of avoiding disruption than seeking 
immediate economic gain”69. Norway could have managed and was managing well 
without any revenues from oil, and, therefore, the priority was not to increase wealth, 
but rather avoid the negative effects from “unearned” revenues.  
But this is not all. Being aware of possible negative effects of monetizing natural 
resources, the Norwegian government, unlike other countries with newfound natural 
resources, took oil management under careful supervision and debated publicly on how 
to manage hydrocarbons. Interviews carried through by the Program on Energy and 
Sustainable Development (PESD) reveal that the Norwegian government deliberately 
did not want to change the economy, the political system or affect in any other way the 
society, which was already functioning quite well in the opinion of its citizens
70
. The 
overriding goal was to stay on the same path as previously. This idea was supported by 
the fact that Norwegian government carried through overwhelming research about other 
countries’ experiences and created “The Ten Commandments” (1971) of guiding 
principles for managing natural resources, and the “Parliamentary Report 25” for 
“considering potential effects of petroleum development on diverse aspects of society, 
focusing in particular on macroeconomic balance, employment, and industrial structure, 
but even touching on such fine grained topics as possible increased commute times for 
petroleum workers and consequent disruption of social and family life“71. The best 
option to achieve these goals was to create some kind of National Oil Company (NOC). 
Although the reasons for this varied, a fully state-owned oil company – Statoil, the 
Norwegian State Oil Company (Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap AS) – was created in 
1972. Understanding the problems involved with fully national oil companies, Statoil 
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goes to stock with 67% of shares to the Government of Norway. As stated earlier, “one 
of the fundamental strengths of Norwegian oil governance was precisely the 
combination of a thoughtful and comprehensive initial roadmap with flexible 
subsequent policymaking against the background of a diverse political system“.72 
This distinctive way of revenue management has been pointed out as the “Norwegian 
Model”, which refers specifically to an administrative design that separates commercial 
from policy and regulatory functions in hydrocarbons”73. The “Norwegian Model” is 
basically an administrative system in which petroleum resources have been 
administered by using three state-controlled bodies. First, national oil company Statoil, 
which is engaged in commercial hydrocarbon operating. Second, the policy making 
body, the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, whose’ responsibilities’ involves goal 
setting and forcing policies into law. Third, the regulatory body, the Norwegian 
Petroleum Directorate (NPD) collects data, advises the Ministry on technical matters 
and sets regulations related to resource management. According to authors Thurber, 
Mark C.; Hults, David R.; Heller, Patrick R.P; „Exporting the „Norwegian Model“: The 
effect of administrative design on oil sector performance“ the theory of „Norwegian 
Model“ has improved oil sector performance in Norway in several ways74. Firstly, 
National Oil Companies are believed to focus more on its commercial activities and 
generating revenues. Secondly, distinct state-controlled institutions might improve 
performance of oils sector and actors involved by being monitored and benchmarked by 
the government. Thirdly, the risk of conflicts of interests are diminished, since all the 
distinctive bodies in the oil sector are submerged under the government and its goals. 
Fourthly, the state’s involvement in hydrocarbon policy prevents at „state within a 
state“ situation, by preventing NOCs from capturing other state institutions.  
So far, I have discussed how Norway managed with the enormous oil discoveries. 
However, this does not fully explain how Norway has managed to keep a democratic 
path. I would like to point out two possible explanations. First, understanding that the 
oil revenues are not infinite. The need to provide future generations with wealth lead to 
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the establishment of the Government Petroleum Fund (GPF) in 1990. Today it is called 
the Government Pension Fund or just Fund, and is aimed to protect the Norwegian 
economy from petroleum related economic fluctuations in the global market. As we will 
see in comparison to other case analyses, these stabilizing mechanisms like the Fund 
and the Action Rule with other factors like transparency, media scrutiny, and the rule of 
law serve a great deal in a country’s economy. Secondly, interviews carried through in 
the Program on Energy and Sustainable Development brought out that public ignorance 
about spending oil revenues also played a great role. The lack of public visibility on 
how the revenues are spent does not give the impression of unbounded national effect. 
For these reasons the traditional work-reward causality remains. 
Norway had to face the same problems and obstacles like every other country that 
suddenly discovered large deposits of natural resources. However, unlike most 
petroleum-dependent countries, Norway had a very thoughtful and distinctive roadmap 
in order to prevent negative effects from the utilization and monetization of natural 
resources. The applied strategy of separate institutional bodies called the “Norwegian 
Model” is characteristic only to Norway. Although several countries, like Algeria, 
Brazil, Mexico, Nigeria, have tried to apply this model, the outcome has been modest 
and they have not met the sustainable and effective separation of functions. Moreover, a 
comprehensive research on the adaptability of the „Norwegian Model” concludes that 
„although the model is, as suggested by the Natural Resource Charter (2009), as a ’best 
practice of sorts , it is not the right prescription for every failing oil sector around the 
world“75.  
5.2 Venezuela 
 
Another significant case to analyze is the case of Venezuela. The oil era in Venezuela 
started back in 1914 with commercial oil development from the Mene Grande fields by 
foreign owned Caribbean Petroleum. The oil sector burst after discovering enormous oil 
fields at Las Cruces and La Rose. Venezuela became the world`s leading oil exporter 
and second-largest oil producer. Unlike the majority of Latin American states during the 
1960s and 1970s, Venezuela followed a path of democracy supporting the claim that 
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natural resources might actually promote democracy. Until recently, Venezuela was 
considered a success story of combining natural resource wealth with democracy, 
having a high level of economic growth, an improving social and economical sphere 
and a high degree of upward mobility. However, recent political developments in 
Venezuela have made it a rather poor example of crude democracy, a notion borrowed 
from Thad Dunning. According to the author of the “Crude Democracy”, the concept 
embraces the idea of democracy being fostered, supported, or sustained by oil wealth
76
. 
Since January 1
st
 1976 fully state owned Venezuela National oil company Petróleos de 
Venezuela, S.A has experienced a variety of events, including nationalization, 
internationalization and transformation under strict state control. In the comprehensive 
Stanford Report “Oil and Governance: State-owned Enterprises and the World Energy 
Supply”, David R. Hults characterizes the Venezuelan case as a “most significant recent 
transformation of the National Oil Companies being the most capable, forward thinking 
and autonomous NOCs between 1976 and 2000s
77
. It seems that oil revenues that once 
enabled the rise of democracy in Venezuela have become the main culprits for 
undermining democratic development in recent years. A closer look at how the 
relationship between taxation burden and regime type has evolved in Venezuela will be 
given and reasons behind it explored in the following section.  
The macroeconomic history of Venezuela has been very diverse and, unfortunately, data 
provided by World Bank does not include the early era of oil in Venezuela and data 
after 2006 when there was a huge shift toward a more autocratic regime. The 
diminishing of democracy has gradually taken place already since 1991, resulting in a 
closed anocracy in 2008. According to the general model the case of Venezuela does 
not support Hypothesis #1. Venezuela tends to fit more with the resource-poor 
countries. Natural resource-poor countries with similar logincome1000 have similar 
taxation as percentage of GDP and Venezuela is close to the best fit line. On the other 
hand, the case of Venezuela appears to support Hypothesis #2 in a sense that its 
relationship between taxation burden and regime type is more similar to resource-
wealthy countries than resource-poor countries. Venezuela, as a closed anocracy has a 
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lighter taxation compared to resource-poor full democracies. Although the financial 
policy has been relatively fluctuating, we can see a general decreasing pattern from 
1991 to 2006. The strengthening of autocracy and declining fiscal burden gives us 
reason to believe that economical autonomy provided by oil revenues allows the 
Venezuelan government to exclude citizens from demand for democratic accountability 
by lowering the burden of taxation.  
GRAPH 5 “Relationship between taxes as a percentage of GDP and political 
regime in Venezuela in 1991 – 2010”7879 
 
 
Why has the Venezuelan success story turned around? What might be behind the 
differences compared to the case of Norway? Do the reasons for the difference lie in the 
changes in the relationship between fiscal policy and regime type in Venezuela? I would 
like to bring out three main differences compared to Norway`s path in managing with 
oil revenues and its possible negative effects. 
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First, a different starting point has to be brought out. We noted earlier that Norway was 
a fully mature democracy with developed institutions and with rising economic 
development. In the 1920s when Venezuela discovered its hydrocarbon reserves, 
Venezuela was, on the other hand, an autocracy with a strong militant background, 
according to Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers Polity IV data. Discovering enormous oil 
reserves did not give rise to public discussion on how to manage oil revenues and how 
to make use of revenues to maximize the benefits for the country. On the contrary, there 
was no fixed plan for further actions dealing with oil management. In the beginning the 
international companies were granted a “fifty-fifty profit split” for a 40 year concession 
agreement. However, political instability followed by attempts to modify previous 
contracts lead to the nationalization of the oil company in 1976. 
Secondly, as we can see, the path to NOC was rather long and complicated. The 
comprehensive book „Oil and Governance: State-Owned Enterprises and the World 
Energy Supply“ claims, that PDVSA was built heavily on its private sector heritage and 
was therefore often referred to as a “Trojan Horse”80. This private business under 
government control still lacked a strategic plan except for maximizing profits. The 
international economic situation was advantageous due to the oil price boom of the 
1970s, followed by the Arab oil embargo of 1973 and the Iranian hostage crisis in 1979. 
As a consequence, oil revenues generated a record share of the overall State budget. 
While in the 1930s petroleum provided just 30 % of the government`s total fiscal 
revenues, it had increased to nearly 60 percent by 1968 and reached its peak of 86 
percent in 1974
81
. Thad Dunning argues that the positive effects of petroleum price 
shocks was the main reason that enabled Venezuela to put into practice massive public 
spending without much cost to elites
82
. As we see in Graph 5, the advantageous 
international economical situation played out winning cards for the Venezuelan 
democracy. From 1969 until 1991 Venezuela had the highest democracy score 
according to Polity IV data.  
However, it was clear that this global situation was not sustainable and revenues 
couldn`t keep increasing. This leads to the third point. In Venezuela, there were no 
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counterbalancing powers installed like in the “Norwegian Model”. This self-governance 
granted the state economic independence and a power that was free from civilian or 
political control, thus allowing to act according to their own best interest. Roberto 
Briceño León concludes in „Petroleum and Democracy in Venezuela“ that this 
economic independency of the government also leads to extreme fragility, because such 
governments depend on a fluctuating revenue that is not based on a solid, normal source 
of profits, but on an extremely fragile exceptional one
83
. Any drop in price of petroleum 
could lead the State to an economic crisis. That said, Venezuela was more exposed to 
oil price fluctuations in the world market than Norway. There were no funds created to 
smoothen the fluctuations. Reduced oil revenues had an enormous effect on public 
spending. The external rent revenues were considerably cut in the 1980s and 1990s after 
the peak in oil rents. This reduced oil revenue was exhibited most visibly in growing 
class inequality and political instabilities. The decline in oil rents made democracy and 
previously established social securities significantly more costly to ruling elites. In the 
beginning of the 90s, social spending was below its 1980s level, including “real cuts of 
greater than 40 percent in education programs, 70 percent in housing and urban 
development, 37 percent in health care, and 56 percent in social development and 
participation”84. The gross domestic product fell nearly 20 percent from the late 1970s 
to the mid-1990s, influencing mainly lower-income groups. As a result, a tax reform 
first proposed already in the 1960s was pushed through. Political party Acción 
Democràtica tried to enforce the law proposals already in 1966 (also 1971; 1975, 1986, 
and 1989) but these were rejected because of hostility from the elites, since they did not 
see the actual need for it.  
As a result this new social and economic situation represented a new polarization of 
classes, which required a new approach. This lead the way for new political structures 
and especially the populist symbol of “people’s power” – Hugo Chàvez. Ivan Krastev 
characterizes Venezuela as a democracy`s double – a regime that claims to be 
democratic and may look like a democracy, but which is ruled like autocracies. 
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“Democracy Double can best be understood as an attempt to construct political regimes 
that mimic democratic institutions but work outside the logic of political representation 
and seek to repress any trace of genuine political pluralism” 85. After a successful 
presidency campaign in 1991 Hugo Chàvez pushed through several laws that secured 
state control over PDVSA. In 2000, the New Hydrocarbons law was introduced, which 
required future private investments to take the form of a joint venture with majority 
PDVSA ownership. Later, Chàvez purged the company from dissidents, converting 
PDVSA from a commercially oriented firm to one that is less proficient but much more 
attentive to state objectives, creating a “state within a state” situation.  
5.3 Qatar 
 
At first glance, Qatar represents a pure case of rentierism. Today, Qatar holds the 
world’s third largest natural gas reserves and is the single largest supplier of liquefied 
natural gas. Proven reserves of oil were the 13
th
 largest in the world at the end of 2012 
with 25.38 billion barrels. Production and exporting of crude oil has tripled since 1986 
and comprised more than 70 % of merchandise exports in 2009. Oil and gas account for 
more than 60% per cent of the country’s gross domestic product, around 85 per cent of 
export earnings and 70% of government revenues. However, significant oil revenues 
have not had a democracy-boosting effect. Being highly dependent on oil exports, Qatar 
has been rated a pure autocracy according to Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers Polity IV data 
without any slight change since 1971 when first data was published for Qatar. Today, 
the fully state owned petroleum company Qatar Petroleum (QP) is closely linked with 
the state’s political and economic interests. This is illustrated by the fact that Qatar 
Petroleum`s Chairman & Managing director HE Dr. Mohammed Bin Saleh Al-Sada is 
also the head of the Ministry of Energy and Industry of Qatar.  
How is the case of Qatar connected to this thesis? The case of Qatar fits with the theory 
of rentierism relatively well. Analyzing the taxation system in resource rich countries, 
the case of Qatar clearly supports Hypothesis #1. Having high personal income per 
capita the introduced taxation burden stays low compared to resource-poor countries on 
that level (Graph 1). Qatar has a slightly higher taxation burden than most natural 
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resource-rich countries and it clearly does not follow the pattern of resource rich 
countries. When it comes to Hypothesis #2, support from the case of Qatar remains 
modest (Graph 2). Although scoring a full autocracy, the taxation burden stays 
relatively high compared to other resource-rich autocracies. The established taxation 
burden for citizens has had no influence on political outcome whatsoever. This point is 
clarified in Graph 6. While having an erratic fiscal system, even the 10 percent point of 
difference in the tax burden as a percentage of gross domestic product has not 
influenced the outcome of accountability and bigger representation.  
GRAPH 6 “Relationship between taxes as a percentage of GDP and political 
regime in Qatar in 2004 – 2010”86 
 
In other words, the case of Qatar supports the idea of a different path of development 
for resource- rich countries, however, undermining the idea of the “taxation effect”. 
How can we explain the resistance of “taxation effects” of autocratic natural resource 
rich Qatar? Furthermore, how does the case of Qatar relates to previous case studies of 
Norway and Venezuela?  
Similarly to Venezuela, Qatar has a very diverse historic background. Oil was 
discovered in 1940 in Dunkhan Field when Qatar was ruled by Sheikh Abdullah bin 
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Jassim Al-Thani who was recognized by the British rule. Although the Qatar Petroleum 
Company was granted a 75-year oil concession, it was not until 1971 when Qatar 
declared its dependence from British rule. The oil sector was immediately fully 
nationalized and linked with the authority of Finance and Petrol Ministry at that time. 
Since then the oil sector have stayed under strong state supervision and serves the 
political and economical interests of their leaders.  
Steven Heydemann refers to the political path of Qatar as an Arab authoritarian 
exceptionalism. By this, the author of the article “Authoritarian Learning and Current 
Trends in Arab Governance” means that the authoritarian governance in Middle East 
shares some distinctive features from the rest of the authoritarian rules. In other words, 
“a condition in which political trajectories are explained by reference to feature unique 
to the Arab world
87
. Benjamin Smith sympathizes with the idea of Arab exceptionalism 
and argues that after a slight decline in the state’s involvement, the oil-gas funded 
mercantilism is on the rise again. “Use of trade as a foreign policy tool (or weapon), and 
of resource revenue-driven economic planning has emerged as an explicit challenge to 
that trend and especially oil-funded mercantilism in the 21st century began, really, in 
1999 with the tripling of oil price”. Furthermore, Andrew Rathmell and Kristen Schulze 
argue in article “Political Reform in the Gulf: The Case of Qatar”, that the majority of 
Arab countries have experienced a special kind of authoritarian regime labeled as 
“democracy of bread” – “the tacit social contract in which the regime provides social 
and economic welfare in return for political loyalty”. So, as we can see, Qatar poses a 
very different story from the case of Venezuela and Norway. Qatar has never 
experienced a democracy and moreover, has never had the intention to move toward it. 
Also, no counterbalancing mechanisms similar to Norway were implemented.  
This raises the question why have there been no attempts to move towards more 
accountability? Graph 6 indicates that fiscal systems have had no influence on political 
regime. I would like to bring out two possible explanations. Unlike many rentier states, 
resource rich Qatar has not failed nor experienced economic breakdown. On the 
contrary, bounties from the oil revenues are not limited only to the ruling power. Qatar 
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is one of the world’s richest countries and so are it citizens. The GDP per person of 
$80,000-plus at purchasing-power parity vastly underrates the wealth of a pampered 
250,000 or so who hold the privilege of citizenship. In 2010 its tiny population had the 
third highest per capita GDP in the world and its economy grew by 16.6%, faster than 
any other. Extreme oil wealth has implemented the „democracy of bread“ to an extreme 
degree, granting citizens several social securities like free health care, education etc. 
Secondly, the Economist’s article „Pygmy with the punch of a giant“ argues that since 
the emirate is extremely small, holding only 1.7 m people and fewer than one in seven 
of them are native-born citizens, this decreases the desirability of democracy
88
. The 
extreme wealth is divided among a small population and there is no attempt to share it 
with broader public. In fact, in 2003 Qatar had a democratic referendum. Qatar`s first 
constitution, enforced in 2005, left real power to the Amir and his family but gave 
citizens the power to directly elect 30 of the 45 members of the Advisory Council. 
However, the general impression to first-ever parliamentary election would be held in 
2013 was very mild
89
.  
To sum up, the case of Qatar is not a typical case of rentierism. Contrary to the theory 
of rentierism the revenues of natural resources have transformed into economic 
prosperity not into democracy. There are no counterbalancing mechanisms introduced 
like in Norway. After discovering more offshore natural gas fields in 2013 with, more 
than 2.8 trillion cubic feet
90
 of reserves is decreasing the probability of pro-democratic 
developments any time soon. However, understanding the finite nature of natural 
resources, Qatar has started to stimulate the private sector and a “knowledge economy” 
labeled Qatar National Vision 2030. The aim is to secure the future with human capital. 
The immediate results have been the Qatar Science Technology Park (QSTP), the Qatar 
Foundation for Education, the Science and Community Development and Education 
                                                             
88 (2011) “Pygmy with the punch of a giant” The Economist,  
(URL: http://www.economist.com/node/21536659, accessed April 4, 2013). 
89 Ibidem. 
90
 (2013) Qatar discovers new natural gas field, Aljazeera,  
(URL: http://www.aljazeera.com/business/2013/03/201331019541509471.html, accessed April 22, 
2013). 
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City, which promote development in four primary areas: energy, environment, 
healthcare, information, technology and telecommunications
91
.  
However, some authors emphasize that these developments are not due to economical 
necessity but careful pragmatic moves. Andrew Rathmell and Kriste Schule argue that 
„since Emir Hamad`s coup in 1995, Qatar has portrayed itself as an increasingly open 
and participatory system”. They argue the decisions are extremely pragmatic for reasons 
of foreign policy and domestic dynastic politics. Blake Hounshell from Foreign Policy 
even argues that this is an attempt to emerge as a player in global politics, the 
willingness to organize the Football World Cup 2013 is only one example
92
. Whatever 
the reasons for development towards more accountability and democratic freedoms, the 
analysis of this research does not show any support for the taxation effect in Qatar.  
                                                             
91 Qatar: National Vision 2030, Forbes Custom,  
(URL: http://www.forbescustom.com/EconomicDevelopmentPgs/QatarNationalVisionP1.html, accessed 
April 22, 2013). 
92
 Hounshell, Blake (2012) “The Qatar Bubble”, Foreign Policy,  
(URL: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/04/23/the_qatar_bubble?page=0,1, accessed April 
22, 2013). 
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6. Conclusions 
 
This thesis analyzed the relationship between the state and economy in resource rich 
countries. The research questions looked for answer about whether taxation systems 
influence the social outcome in natural resource rich countries. The question was based 
on the theory of rentierism and the “taxation effect”. The assumption of this thesis 
proposes that a higher taxation burden brings more accountability and representation 
from governments. In natural resource-rich countries, however, there is no need for 
taxation, which might lead towards more autocracy. In order to test this question I 
conducted three analytical models controlling the differences between taxation systems 
in resource-rich and resource-poor countries (Hypothesis #1), if the taxation burden 
influences the political regime (Hypothesis #2) and effects of political regime on 
income (Hypothesis #3). After the general research model I carried through 
comprehensive case study on Norway, Venezuela and Qatar. The selection of these 
countries was based on methodological reasons and in order to include variety.  
The general results of the model predict that natural resource-rich countries do not 
follow the pattern of autocracy nor democracy. The results of this research do not show 
single clear characteristics of the relationship between taxation and political regime type 
in resource-rich countries. These results are also supported by the case analysis of these 
thesis. Changes in the taxation system did not have any significant influence on regime 
type either in the case of Norway, Venezuela nor Qatar. Oil discoveries in Norway have 
not brought any change to country’s democracy nor taxation burden. Venezuela, on the 
other hand, has shown a slight pattern of lowering taxation and erosion of democracy, 
however not so significant as to be fully conclusive. Qatar has remained a stable 
autocracy even after changes in the taxation burden by more than 10 percentage points. 
However, recent democratic developments, such as a new constitution, gives us reason 
to suggest further analysis.  
This thesis shows some support for hypothesis #1 in that the natural resource wealthy 
countries tend to tax its citizens on a different basis compared to natural resource- poor 
countries. Correlation between personal income and tax revenues (percentage of GDP) 
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indicates that in mineral-rich countries, a higher income usually comes with lower 
taxes. This is contrary to resource-poor countries where a higher personal income tends 
to generate higher tax burden. Furthermore, heavily resource dependent countries tend 
to have a lower tax burden and less democracy (Hypothesis #2). While non resource 
dependent countries tend to be more democratic along with higher tax system. The case 
of Qatar clearly illustrates this point by being a country with very high personal income 
but with a lower taxation burden than other countries. However, other case studies show 
more modest support for this hypothesis, with Norway being and extreme opposite 
example.  
The results of this thesis propose that taxation plays a great role in resource-rich 
countries and countries with natural resource-wealth tend to have different pattern as 
compared to pure autocracies or democracies. However, I have found no significant 
evidence for the “taxation effect”. The effects of the taxation burden often referred to as 
fiscal sociology by Joseph Schumpeter is much smaller than one might assume and the 
results of this thesis did not show a strong indubitable relationship between fiscal policy 
and political regime in resource-wealthy countries. All the natural-resource rich 
countries face the same problems of, how to effectively manage resource revenues, 
provide sustainable development and secure the future wellbeing of its citizens. Having 
natural resources might foster the preferred outcomes and also bring out negative 
effects. There is no single recipe to deal effectively with resource revenues. And applied 
methods like the “Norwegian Model” are not successful in every country. The presented 
case studies constituted important puzzles that the “taxation effect” never entirely 
resolved. Money does not spend itself and therefore, the outcome is determined by 
many factors. Whether the key aspect is leaders’ decisions, strength of institutions, role 
of public spending or something else, is beyond the scope of this thesis and will remain 
an interesting topic for further analysis.  
There is great reason to believe that the applied taxation system is not the main factor 
within the institutional approach that influences the political regime in heavily resource 
dependent countries. This analysis concludes that the correlation between the taxation 
system and the political regime in resource-rich countries is not significant and the 
fiscal policy is not the principal factor affecting political regime. Although this master’s 
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thesis do not solve entirely the puzzle it adds some valuable insight and some new 
perspectives to the debate how natural resources influence country’s development. 
Apart from the impact of natural resources on taxation, the data analysis in this thesis 
raises broader questions about what affects taxation. First, Graph 1 indicates that 
increased wealth (per capita income) tends to increase taxes as share of GDP, while 
extensive mineral exports have the opposite effect. The question raises, what else affects 
taxation in a systematic way, and how can these impacts be combined into a logical 
model? Second, Graph 2 indicates a puzzling parabolic relationship 
between autocracy/democracy (D) and wealth. With the scales and units used, 
log(wealth)=2(D/10)
2
 expresses quite well the average pattern. But why should both 
extreme democracy and extreme autocracy go with high wealth? Natural resources do 
not offer a full answer. Here this thesis engenders broader questions, which go beyond 
the scope of the thesis itself. 
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Summary  
 
The aim of this master`s thesis has been to analyze the relationship between taxation 
and political regime. This research topic is derived from the common idea of negative 
effect of natural resources on a country’s social and economical performance – 
phenomena often referred to as rentierism. The core idea poses that resource abundant 
countries become over dependent on export of natural resources, resulting in low social 
and economic performance. There are several academic approaches to the theory of 
rentierism, however, this thesis presents the most broadly used institutional approach. 
Based on this I argue that taxation as a secondary institutional factor has an influence on 
the resource abundant country’s political regime – an idea first proposed by Joseph 
Schumpeter. To test the linkage between taxation and level of democracy in resource 
wealthy countries careful empirical testing was needed. In order to do that I posed three 
sub-hypotheses. First, I tested if resource rich countries tend to have a different fiscal 
policy. To build the analytical model I used Gross National Income (GNI) for 2010 data 
available from World Bank and annual percentage of revenue taxes from countries GDP 
data collected by IMF in 2010. The relatively strong supporting results lead to the 
second sub-hypothesis that a higher taxation burden brings more democracy. Using data 
tax revenue percentage of GDP and Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers Polity IV, it was 
revealed that although there seems to be slight pattern in the connection between 
taxation and democracy, this is not that significant. The last sub-hypothesis checked 
previous results by analyzing how personal income and type of regime interact with 
each other. The analytical model did not reveal any significant correlation. The results 
of this empirical work were confronted with three case studies – Norway, Venezuela 
and Qatar. These countries were selected keeping in mind the methodological reasons 
and in order to include variety. After carrying through a careful case analysis the results 
supported the outcome from the previously built analytical model. There seems to be no 
clear linkage between taxation and type of political regime in resource rich countries. 
Taxes as an institutional outcome are important phenomena, however, as a secondary 
phenomena in the general institutional framework, not the main factor influencing the 
social and economic outcome in resource abundant countries. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix 1. “Natural recourses exporting countries by regime type”  
Regime Democracy  Anocracy  Autocracy  
Total: (165) 95 48 22 
Countries with fuel export >30% of merchandise exports 
 Full 
Democracy 
(10) 
Democracy  
(6 to 9) 
Open 
Anocracy  
(1 to 5) 
Closed 
Anocracy  
(-5 to 0) 
Autocracy  
(-10 to -6) 
 Norway Colombia Algeria 
Belize 
Ecuador 
Gabon 
Iraq 
Nigeria 
 
Cameroon 
Congo 
Russia 
Sudan  
(+ South 
Sudan) 
Venezuela 
Yemen 
Kazakhstan 
Turkmenistan 
Uzbekistan 
Azerbaijan 
Iran 
Saudi Arabia 
Oman 
United Arab 
Emirates 
Qatar 
Kuwait 
Syria 
Total: 25 1 1 6 6 11 
Out of resource 
rich countries 
(%) 
(1/25)*100% = 
4% 
4  24 24 44 
Out of regime 
type (%) 
(2/95)*100% = 2,11 25 50 
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Appendix 2. 
 
“Tax revenue as percentage of GDP” 
Country Name Country Code 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
World WLD 15,47188 14,42531 14,46155 14,66858 14,81377 15,40561 15,59086 14,92709 13,54161 14,19016
Afghanistan AFG 6,290691 5,288022 5,225979 7,266421 8,313807
Albania ALB 16,10892 17,07193 17,29176
Algeria ALG 40,70078 37,20343 45,25582 34,91183
American Samoa ASM
Andorra AND
Angola ANG
Antigua and Barbuda ATG
Argentina ARG 9,818954 12,51878 14,19743
Armenia ARM 13,99979 13,99641 14,33566 14,39599 15,96253 17,32176 16,50586 16,86806
Aruba ABW
Australia AUL 22,98474 24,68702 23,3803 24,22423 24,219 24,73191 24,48654 23,99882 24,0912 22,14714 20,79435
Austria AUS 19,79205 21,51965 20,96478 21,07204 20,78867 20,08947 19,68002 19,97659 20,1083 18,68729 18,42522
Azerbaijan AZE 16,42118 14,10671 12,15778
Bahamas, The BHS 13,63025 12,58468 11,48641 11,85584 12,0343 12,76615 14,35733 14,49842 15,47168 14,64127 14,27089
Bahrain BAH 4,244386 4,64578 4,043726 3,757162 4,935495 1,378411 1,361113 1,34702
Bangladesh BNG 7,596541 7,697523 8,071475 8,11135 8,22067 8,171802 8,049301 8,818271 8,599141
Barbados BRB 35,5908 33,15248 30,69658 27,24129
Belarus BLR 16,62473 15,75466 14,20104 17,68812 18,37135 20,14966 22,2231 23,7267 25,35339 19,25963 16,91581
Belgium BEL 27,32778 26,94399 25,9372 25,315 25,89316 26,00784 25,71391 25,03809 25,34616 23,91748 24,5886
Belize BLZ
Benin BEN 15,46708 15,68167 15,66474 16,34988 15,47201 15,95774 17,24794 16,27959 16,37214
Bermuda BMU
Bhutan BHU 10,28362 8,914452 9,792079 9,53431 7,820352 8,346585 9,030973 7,519483 8,420716 9,23515
Bolivia BOL 13,1841 12,973 15,01635 16,21516 16,81617 16,96487
Bosnia and Herzegovina BIH 19,76277 19,03101 20,38543 22,50246 22,09173 20,92558 19,53515 20,31103
Botswana BOT
Brazil BRA 14,00388 14,71205 15,83672 15,40582 15,88464 16,70868 16,45533 16,80935 16,7167 15,37815 15,267
Brunei Darussalam BRN
Bulgaria BUL 17,87999 17,11367 16,38622 18,22702 21,27927 21,61056 22,50215 23,13009 23,2697 21,01527 19,14597
Burkina Faso BFO 10,58849 10,923 12,02682 11,75282 12,06365 12,71471 11,89122 12,54676 12,94326
Burundi BUI
Cambodia CAM 8,172912 7,537844 8,117265 7,893243 8,178915 9,696979 10,5552 9,668702 10,12138
Cameroon CAO
Canada CAN 15,24062 14,62392 13,82178 13,65384 13,77955 13,73117 13,74995 13,70983 12,78562 12,40202 11,93199
Cape Verde CAP 21,07697 22,74444 23,77649 24,38569 19,77427
Cayman Islands CYM
Central African Republic CEN 6,214223
Chad CHA
Channel Islands CHI
Chile CHL 16,72191 16,59747 16,79696 16,30546 17,01229 18,01176 19,50665 20,31834 18,71309 14,50617 17,53631
China CHN 6,815633 7,402022 8,503402 8,538996 8,860552 8,679594 9,18806 9,928817 10,26866 10,53973
Colombia COL 11,02832 9,85437 11,22677 10,53215 12,81286 11,83208 13,60424 12,316 11,8309 11,49909
Comoros COM
Congo, Dem. Rep. ZAI 3,456501 4,363621 6,667435 6,36838 8,344568 9,8506 11,1835 11,68669 15,19797 13,13603 13,73681
Congo, Rep. CON 5,935426 9,215641 8,361449 8,702774 7,849248 6,243112
Costa Rica COS 15,72457 13,7946 13,46793
Cote d'Ivoire CIV 14,90563 15,17896 9,770377 15,0238 15,47522 15,57469 16,55515 16,99198
Croatia CRO 22,42281 21,05793 21,63418 20,92861 20,14067 20,04451 20,0894 20,18015 20,16523 18,9979 18,78764
Cuba CUB
Curacao CUW
Cyprus CYP 39,31643 40,45838 41,15398 43,65512 42,82043 45,43914 47,70996 54,14499 51,01589 25,77068 25,86716
Czech Republic CZR 14,88782 15,28566 15,1257 15,47918 15,08402 14,90082 14,08665 14,65658 14,21298 13,05573 13,52818
Denmark DEN 30,82221 29,5494 29,4229 29,48763 30,79458 32,60966 31,57572 35,78157 34,76915 34,27915 33,91911
Djibouti DJI
Dominica DMA
Dominican Republic DOM 12,89309 14,55017 14,83691 15,91425 14,92905 13,06704
Ecuador ECU
Egypt, Arab Rep. EGY 13,40776 13,34994 13,83598 14,06864 15,82951 15,34985 15,32052 15,66136 14,13008
El Salvador SAL 10,71037 11,15926 10,99359 12,47704 13,51539 14,16869 14,31851 12,7593 13,61309  
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Equatorial Guinea EQG
Eritrea ERI
Estonia EST 15,76828 15,48444 16,02946 16,19127 15,96238 16,05922 16,18279 16,37646 14,90351 17,2202 16,16118
Ethiopia ETI 8,145883 9,784309 9,186839 9,755028 8,791357 8,326272 7,872492 7,432405 6,631195 9,830251
Faeroe Islands FRO
Fiji FJI 22,19002 21,34806 23,18702
Finland FIN 24,64768 22,40753 22,97105 22,74017 22,54935 22,58605 22,10117 21,66435 21,20806 19,60607 19,16971
France FRN 23,18964 22,97899 22,45893 22,13178 22,27067 22,41563 22,53315 21,88679 21,66657 19,84598 21,28418
French Polynesia PYF
Gabon GAB
Gambia, The GAM
Georgia GRG 7,651757 7,352414 7,616658 7,032852 9,927429 12,11003 15,44825 17,71531 23,80936 23,13855 22,13913
Germany GMY 11,60391 10,96817 10,9258 11,08359 10,60254 10,81011 11,02252 11,48857 11,55388 11,82944 11,48256
Ghana GHA 17,19293 17,49311 18,47769 21,75211 21,32151 12,80738 13,87793 13,89595 12,61213 13,38824
Greece GRC 23,4643 22,00925 21,61051 19,95724 19,76596 20,33777 20,45786 20,82496 20,46537 19,5664 19,59943
Greenland GRL
Grenada GRD
Guam GUM
Guatemala GUA 10,06498 10,86303 11,88055 11,67386 11,55273 11,20539 11,85697 12,05936 11,27381 10,33552 10,43471
Guinea GUI
Guinea-Bissau GNB
Guyana GUY
Haiti HAI
Honduras HON 13,74646 14,49586 14,53485 15,23835 16,385 16,13052 14,57337 14,83632
Hong Kong SAR, China HKG 9,094631 10,60391 12,04491 12,66239 12,72228 14,24491 12,95167 12,78415 13,79103
Hungary HUN 22,64187 21,70615 21,16 21,05121 20,69736 20,27891 20,13859 21,83904 23,67244 23,92815 22,99148
Iceland ISL 26,05342 23,6601 23,63567 24,66871 25,83885 28,10662 28,06615 27,31004 24,30172 21,49059 21,90566
India IND 8,693279 7,965619 8,545825 8,962471 9,405871 9,913767 11,02548 11,89429 10,74876 9,802362 9,727842
Indonesia INS 11,57818 11,82696 12,38553 12,33077 12,50238 12,25446 12,42728 13,03621 11,43073 10,86955
Iran, Islamic Rep. IRN 6,34189 6,316443 5,518011 5,897925 6,048875 7,851609 7,428923 7,262472 7,556702 9,256529
Iraq IRQ
Ireland IRE 25,77325 23,92646 23,01821 23,45994 24,54517 24,92421 26,27661 25,43921 23,26142 21,24034 21,17872
Isle of Man IMN
Israel ISR 28,70307 28,42291 27,6372 26,7507 26,62528 26,98604 27,64709 27,89878 25,46733 23,2548 24,29569
Italy ITA 23,07251 22,70466 21,96451 21,99307 21,47871 21,10515 22,61868 22,90087 22,39472 22,93473 22,58696
Jamaica JAM 24,54518 25,21818 24,841 25,15374 25,90136 26,56361 26,16657 26,12289
Japan JPN 10,54397 10,9317 10,47485 9,279197 8,695083 9,149554
Jordan JOR 18,99115 18,66992 17,478 18,21365 20,99608 24,41581 24,55494 24,6896 17,6876 17,02853 15,9146
Kazakhstan KZK 10,2214 9,642301 12,13436 13,08324 13,90868 17,14934 14,85084 12,27857 12,66099 8,055137 8,93861
Kenya KEN 16,83114 17,83177 17,2946 15,76577 16,97282 18,67046 17,37619 17,79019 18,77561 18,81952 19,54549
Kiribati KIR
Korea, Dem. Rep. PRK
Korea, Rep. ROK 15,40602 14,70534 14,42917 14,94749 14,24559 14,73181 15,19067 16,55969 16,29945 15,44938 15,1472
Kosovo KOS
Kuwait KUW 1,037286 1,182053 1,324735 1,324428 1,029967 0,970478 1,086523 0,87582 0,971192 0,909244
Kyrgyz Republic KYR 11,74379 12,43569 14,21827 16,39634 16,50851 15,03609 15,03031
Lao PDR LAO 10,4897 11,58776 12,10293 12,75716 12,92982
Latvia LAT 14,15564 13,74106 13,72899 14,10029 13,61095 15,05448 15,87239 15,64492 15,0109 13,40915 12,77158
Lebanon LEB 11,90123 11,87808 14,43059 15,37671 16,03191 14,91599 14,7302 14,80733 15,89402 17,0855
Lesotho LSO 37,3777 40,24574 38,26639 40,89422 46,71757 46,18593 61,01812 56,8941 58,85827
Liberia LBR 0,234376 0,231095 0,309304 0,315905
Libya LIB
Liechtenstein LIE
Lithuania LIT 14,55502 14,38743 17,29419 17,08357 16,962 17,25997 17,85711 17,74781 17,38423 13,97877 13,35847
Luxembourg LUX 26,37521 25,94065 25,37499 24,5546 24,39715 25,24806 24,164 24,01047 23,67068 24,49459 24,48569
Macao SAR, China MAC 16,5673 17,26853 18,12917 20,85773 22,06664 21,6373 21,57881 25,9957 30,67312 29,68601 34,35472
Macedonia, FYR MAC 19,26158 18,91776 19,4877 19,09445
Madagascar MAG 11,32608 9,738941 7,669634 10,00898 10,87752 10,10562 10,67094 11,43291 13,00439
Malawi MAW
Malaysia MAL 13,66691 17,79489 17,44696 15,49566 15,19909 15,42612 15,08081 14,82261 15,20563 15,66384 14,29768
Maldives MDV 13,79611 10,84571 10,47164 10,63347 12,1543 13,5614 14,20831 14,71883 13,90498 10,99043 11,03311  
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Mali MLI 13,15201 13,94888 13,00139 13,76618 15,28848 15,65609 15,66268 14,88175 13,27437 14,74822
Malta MLT 24,27215 25,93258 26,08896 27,2685 28,29212 27,19401 27,81869
Marshall Islands MHL
Mauritania MAA
Mauritius MAS 18,69474
Mexico MEX 11,65529
Micronesia, Fed. Sts. FSM
Moldova MLD 14,72585 12,17134 12,88135 14,67291 16,35751 18,4854 19,57105 20,5667 20,4461 17,68526
Monaco MCO
Mongolia MON 13,91016 14,66206 13,36924 18,03875 28,70997 23,47918 21,65182 16,54029
Montenegro MNT
Morocco MOR 19,93177 19,63512 19,87134 21,96626 22,43165 25,11865 27,57396 23,96978
Mozambique MZM
Myanmar MYA 2,966507 2,257141 2,001047 2,210412 3,272456
Namibia NAM 27,52966 26,39518 25,97572 23,17565 24,28691 25,76066 29,14517 27,33425
Nepal NEP 8,735981 8,802566 8,560583 8,651812 8,974959 9,179453 8,779758 9,772473 10,44009 11,84404
Netherlands NTH 22,33013 22,59392 22,5206 21,63792 21,62917 22,63721 23,19387 23,37501 22,84901 22,66132
New Caledonia NCL
New Zealand NEW 29,09745 28,70952 29,7584 29,74308 30,75909 32,61942 30,83883 32,17863 30,80051
Nicaragua NIC 13,81416 12,71863 13,48803 15,20761 15,81399 16,73733 17,69589 18,17424 17,60356 17,54561
Niger NIR 10,09072 10,70062 11,34007
Nigeria NIG 0,23042 0,175064 0,11668 0,195383 0,279012
Northern Mariana Islands MNP
Norway NOR 27,43522 26,8792 27,93311 26,30943 27,80635 28,72546 29,397 28,80424 28,26626 26,56392
Oman OMA 7,161745 7,388045
Pakistan PAK 10,08899 10,04261 10,31131 10,78384 10,28455 9,604414 9,427413 9,838226 9,859638 9,277453
Palau PLW
Panama PAN 10,20438 9,260131
Papua New Guinea PNG 18,97596 24,69645 21,01325
Paraguay PAR 10,85778 10,77419 10,127 10,30804 11,87143 11,84878 12,04245 11,41031 11,74807 12,97094
Peru PER 12,23223 12,44139 12,0519 12,84044 13,09095 13,51694 15,04869 15,63309 15,69545 13,74864
Philippines PHI 12,84755 12,59666 11,82304 12,10329 11,81462 12,42781 13,7113 13,5351 13,58881 12,23042
Poland POL 15,98842 17,00801 16,95855 15,69443 16,67372 17,35808 18,30757 18,30509 16,3286
Portugal POR 20,54466 20,23488 20,73137 20,8035 19,93061 20,64843 21,33614 21,66681 21,44428 19,51529
Puerto Rico PRI
Qatar QAT 25,55534 21,04848 20,17915 20,64804 15,95784 19,96832
Romania RUM 11,74065 12,27864 12,30175 12,20841 11,37557 11,8111 17,888
Russian Federation RUS 13,64919 13,31403 13,23403 16,62291 16,56822 16,55131 15,81807 12,95635
Rwanda RWA
Samoa WSM
San Marino SMR 23,51806 21,96865 20,69813 21,98806 22,37013 22,84534 22,2649
Sao Tome and Principe STP
Saudi Arabia SAU
Senegal SEN 16,12958 16,11536
Serbia SER 23,60934 23,11101 22,50378
Seychelles SYC 26,08089 25,25721 26,13803 32,72899 35,39972 27,36441 24,61362 23,58498 22,48137 25,42369
Sierra Leone SIE 10,16039 12,03477 11,37662 11,51506 10,78354 10,76639 11,18011 10,21783 10,52579 11,04012
Singapore SIN 15,13432 14,93355 12,95445 12,66525 11,84508 11,79659 12,06491 13,06316 14,98922 14,69761
Sint Maarten (Dutch part) SXM
Slovak Republic SLO 17,23402 15,84101 14,91492 13,9405 14,19442 13,51249 12,43714
Slovenia SLV 20,46252 20,41931 18,81054 20,73844 20,4878 20,54129 20,99534 19,64788 19,92931 18,07136
Solomon Islands SOL
Somalia SOM
South Africa SAF 23,95569 24,80532 24,19634 24,00119 25,33469 26,86034 28,38043 28,87329 28,07609 25,47558
South Sudan SUD
Spain SPN 16,16858 15,83546 12,78601 12,18672 11,75855 12,87796 13,46826 13,87623 10,4787 8,608545
Sri Lanka SRI 14,50277 14,62551 13,55629 12,71068 13,46597 13,73253 14,57726 14,22161 13,27733
St. Kitts and Nevis KNA 16,23938 18,15383 20,06828 22,6884 21,60766 19,6911 19,19254 19,26649
St. Lucia LCA
St. Martin (French part) MAF
St. Vincent and the GrenadinesVCT 20,63168 20,28789 21,84716 20,92175 20,61023 20,47203 22,00843 21,76856 23,7264 23,83221  
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Sudan SUD
Suriname SUR
Swaziland SWA 24,30882 23,97565 24,07951 26,1012
Sweden SWD 23,6495 21,45605 20,37084 20,70812 21,34995 22,58607 23,25609 22,42447 21,65221 21,54746 21,3866
Switzerland SWZ 11,08721 10,03902 9,951442 9,951134 9,979079 10,30858 10,42721 10,00155 10,87561
Syrian Arab Republic SYR
Tajikistan TAJ 7,702823 8,201888 9,70953 9,821183
Tanzania TAZ
Thailand THI 15,46033 15,91719 17,24284 16,74466 16,12207 16,44629 15,16303 15,972
Timor-Leste TLS
Togo TOG 15,31041 13,88488 14,81059 16,19505 14,90892 15,37247 15,68753
Tonga TON
Trinidad and Tobago TTO 22,12129 20,4555 21,43331 22,70123 26,3787 30,25756 25,99529 29,48841 26,16349
Tunisia TUN 19,29237 19,5975 19,54062 18,74521 18,67219 18,8775 18,51076 19,06413 20,49121 20,01725 20,11746
Turkey TUR 19,69712 18,72831 18,58659 18,91177 20,56741
Turkmenistan TKM
Turks and Caicos Islands TCA
Tuvalu TUV
Uganda UGA 10,44395 10,43959 11,17998 11,26114 10,68892 11,75955 12,25196 12,39381 12,90343 12,1668 12,04757
Ukraine UKR 14,10037 12,06136 13,0987 13,65448 13,27566 17,12308 17,74755 16,4846 17,86266 16,37177 15,52417
United Arab Emirates UAE
United Kingdom UKG 28,44188 28,21603 27,05595 26,34292 26,57061 27,24477 27,95919 27,63765 28,93156 25,89568 26,73997
United States USA 12,50941 10,37529 9,849251 9,988447 11,21205 11,91301 11,91866 10,38036 8,589688 9,383364
Uruguay URU 14,69914 15,30598 15,77768 17,20601 17,8462 17,89692 18,98806 18,41051 18,24184 19,43674 19,30451
Uzbekistan UZB
Vanuatu VUT
Venezuela, RB VEN 13,2866 11,79628 10,95046 11,53416 12,92812 15,51373
Vietnam VIE
Virgin Islands (U.S.) VIR
West Bank and Gaza PSE
Yemen, Rep. YEM
Zambia ZAM 18,6214 17,42504 16,65324 17,51903 17,1717 16,34406 16,88945 17,39439 14,96165 16,57942
Zimbabwe ZIM  
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Kokkuvõte 
 
ÜKSIKISIKU MAKSUSTAMINE JA POLIITILISE REŽIIMI VAHELINE SEOS 
MAAVARADERIKASTES RIIKIDES 
Marie Jaksman 
Käesolev magistritöö analüüsib indiviididele kehtestatud maksude ja demokraatia 
vahelist seost maavarade poolest rikastes riikides. Uurimusküsimus on tuletatud 
tuginedes eelkõige rantjee riigi teooriale, mille kohaselt maavarade poolest rikkad riigid 
muutuvad antud ekspordiartiklist sõltuvaks, mis omakorda pärsib riikide sotsiaalset ja 
majanduslikku arengut. Antud rantjee riigi teooriat ning võimalike põhjuseid rantjee 
riikide vähesele arengule on akadeemilises kirjanduses palju uuritud, kuid teoreetilised 
ja empiirilised põhjused varieeruvad suuresti. Siinne magistritöö esindab kõige 
levinumat - institutsionaalset lähenemist, mille järgi maavarde poolest rikaste riikide 
vähene areng on tingutud riikide institutsionaalsest nõrkusest. Olgugi, et puudub 
konkreetne definitsioon peetakse siinkohal silmas riigi institutsioonide võimekust 
jälgida reeglitest ja kokkulepetest kinnipidamist. Antud magistritöö teiseks keskseks 
teooriaks on Joseph Schumpeteri “fiskaal sotsioloogia” tihti nimetatud ka kui 
“maksustamise efekt”, mis väidab, et riikide poliitiline režiim on vormitud riigis 
kehtestatud maksusüsteemi poolt. Teisisõnu, maksustamine kui institutsionaalne faktor 
mõjutab suuresti demokraatia arengut, kuna kodanikud on kaasatud 
võimumehhanismidesse maksude tasandil. Kui demokraatliku riigis on kehtestatud 
maksude eesmärgiks riigimehhanismide käigus hoidmine, siis maavarade poolest 
rikastes riikides see ühendus puudub. Käesolev magistritöö püstitab hüpoteesi, et 
maavarade ekspordist saadud tulu muudab riigid majanduslikult autonoomseks, mistõttu 
puudub vajadus kodanikke maksustada, mille tulemusel väheneb võimu jagamine riigi 
kodanikega. 
Antud magistritöö kontrollib antud väidet kolme analüütilise mudeliga ning hiljem 
kolme juhtumanalüüsiga – Norra, Venetsueela, Katar. Juhtumanalüüsi valik tugines 
metodoloogilistel põhjustel ning eesmärgiga lisada geograafilist mitmekesisust. Esiteks,  
kontrollin, väidet, kas mineraalide rikastes riikides kehtestatud maksukoormus erineb 
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maavarade poolest vaestes riikidest (Hüpotees #1). Siinkohal on maavarade rikkad 
riigid defineeritud toetudes ÜRO SITC osa 3. jaotusele. Selle järgi on nendeks 
mineraalideks kivisüsi, koks, brikett, petrooleum ja kõikvõimalikud 
petrooleumproduktid, naturaalne ja töödeldud gaas. Korrelatsiooni analüüsimiseks on 
kasutatud riikide rahvuslikku keskmist sissetulekut (Gross National Income, GNI), 2010 
aasta Maailmapanga andmestikku ning IMF andmestik 2010. aastal indiviididele 
kehtestatud maksude protsent sisemajanduse koguproduktist (Gross Domestic Product, 
GDP). Siinkohal olen eelistanud GNI andmestikku, mis peegeldab hästi rahvastiku 
keskmist jõukust, kuna on tihedalt seotud näitajatega, mis mõõdavad majanduslikku, 
sotsiaalset ja keskkondlikku heaolu. Põhjalik analüüs toetab väidet, et mineraalide 
rikastes riikides on indiviididele kehtestatud maksusüsteemid madalamad, mis annab 
põhjuse uskuda, et antud riigid toetuvad eelkõige maavaradest saadud tulule kui 
kehtestatud maksudele.  
Teine mudel testib, kuidas indiviididele kehtestatud maksukoormus mõjutab poliitilist 
režiimi (Hüpotees #2). Selleks on kasutatud Marshall, Gurr ja Jaggers Polity IV 2010. 
aasta andmestikku ning IMF koostatud andmestikku indiviididele kehtestatud 
maksukoormuse osakaalu kohta SKPst. Polity IV andmestik analüüsib iseseisvate 
riikide (populatsioon suurem kui 500 000) poliitilise režiimi arengut 1800 – 2010. 
Antud andmestik on eelistatud Freedom House Indeksile, kuna annab parema ülevaate 
poliitilise režiimi esinduslikkusest. Tulemused näitavad, et ülekaalukalt maavarade 
ekspordist sõltuvad riigid kalduvad olema rohkem autokraatlikud ning väiksema 
maksukoormusega. Siiski jäävad tulemused statistiliselt ebaoluliseks. 
Kolmanda mudeliga kontrolliti, kuidas mõjutab poliitiline režiim indiviidide 
sissetulekut. Selleks asetasin korrelatsiooni Marshall, Gurr ja Jaggers Polity IV 2010 
andmestiku ning indiviidide keskmine sissetulek 2010. aastal Maailmapanga järgi. 
Tulemused ei kinnita seost poliitilise režiimi ja indiviidide sissetuleku vahel. Siinkohal 
on oluline välja tuua, olgugi, et GNI väljendab hästi riikide üldist heaolu, siis jätab 
välja, kuidas rikkus on toodetud. Kui suur osakaal on toodetud erasektoris ning 
riigisektoris. Siinkohal võib vastav eristus olla võtmetähtsusega.  
Käesolev magistritöö eesmärgiks oli testida indiviididele kehtestatud maksusukoormuse 
ja poliitilise režiimi vahelist seost mineraalide rikastes riikides. Tulemused näitavad, et 
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maavarade poolest rikastes riikides sotsiaalne ja majanduslik tulem erineb riikidest, kus 
maavarade eksport ei domineeri, kuid antud uurimus ei leidnud statistiliselt olulist  
toetust “maksustamise efektile”, mida kinnitasid ka juhtumanalüüsid. Kõik maavarade 
rikkad riigid seisavad vastamisi samade küsimustega, kuidas efektiivselt kasutada 
maavarade ekspordist saadavat tulu. Puudub ühene lahendus, kuidas vältida maavarade 
“lõksu” sattumist ning isegi Norras väljatöötatud “ Norra mudel” ei ole ennast tõestanud 
teistes riikides. Käesolev magistritöö järeldab, et indiviidide maksustamine kui 
sekundaarne faktor üldises institutsionaalses raamistuks omab küll tähtsust, kuid ei ole 
demokraatia kujundamisel võtmetähtsusega.   
 
